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Part I:  
Research question, contextualization and 
methodology 
 
Chapter 1: Why defining ‘international protection’ matters 
1.1  Subject matter and research question 
‘Protection’ is the most central concept in the international refugee protec-
tion regime. When talking about ‘protection’ within this legal regime we are 
talking about the lack of protection of refugees in its country of origin; 
about the potential state responsibility according to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol1 and about the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) mandate to 
provide ‘international protection’ to refugees. In sum, the definition of ‘pro-
tection’ shapes both the duties of states and UNHCR, and establishes refu-
gee entitlements. In spite of its obvious significance, the term ‘protection’ is 
left undefined in binding sources of law and there is currently no universal 
consensus on its implications. 
The focus of this thesis is on the meaning of ‘international protec-
tion’ in Article 1 of the 1950 UNHCR Statute, which states that the UNHCR 
shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices 
of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute 
and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.2 
Established in 1950, the UNHCR was originally restricted to provide ‘inter-
national protection’ to people who became refugees prior to 1 January 
                                                 
* I wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my two supervisors, who came in at just the 
right time and provided me with crucial support and guidance. I cannot overstate what it 
has meant to have your moral and academic support during the past six months. Thank you! 
Also, big thanks to Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde for giving me wise advice at a time when it was 
most needed. I am of course solely responsible for the content of the thesis. 
1 I will refer to these as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 





1951.3 Dr. Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart, the first High Commissioner – 
who commanded a staff of thirty three and an annual budget of $ 30,0004 – 
originally interpreted UNHCR’s mandate in the following way:  
It was to be a ‘non-operational’ relatively small unit, mainly charged with provid-
ing international protection and assisting governments to find solutions for refugee 
problems. For its activities it was to rely heavily on the many excellent voluntary 
agencies working in this field. Moreover, the United Nations were not to pay more 
from their regular budget than the administrative expenses involved in the running 
of a Head Office in Geneva and Branch Offices wherever they might be estab-
lished.5 
The above quote illustrates the dominant view in the 1950s, which consid-
ered the UNHCR as a provider of ‘international protection’ that left field 
presence to other humanitarian agencies and promoted the interests of refu-
gees by serving as liaison with governments. 
Since 1950, UNHCR has grown to become the institutional centre-
piece of the international refugee protection regime. Today the agency has 
10,800 employees and an annual budget of $ 7, 5 billion.6 It describes its 
‘international protection’ activities in the following way: 
Providing emergency help to those forced to flee is often the first step towards 
long-term protection and rehabilitation. To meet these and other operational 
needs, UNHCR has developed a global network of suppliers, specialist agencies 
and partners. Projects can range from dispatching emergency teams to the scene of 
a crisis, providing emergency food, shelter, water and medical supplies, and ar-
ranging major airlifts for a large exodus of refugees or a flotilla of small boats for 
smaller numbers of fleeing civilians. Among a host of other programmes, there are 
projects to help protect the environment, build schools and raise awareness of such 
problems as HIV/AIDS.7 
The two quotes clearly illustrate that the activities performed by UNHCR to 
meet the function of providing ‘international protection’ has both increased 
in scope and changed in content. From being a non-operational and time 
limited agency, UNHCR now has “a host of programmes” in order to pro-
vide “long-term protection”. The significantly altered approach to its man-
                                                 
3 Article 5 and 6, ibid. 
4 Feller, 2001a, 131. This equal approximately $ 300.000 today. 
5 Goedheart, 195508.05.2017. 
6 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017a. 




date could imply that the UNHCR Statute has been amended. However, the 
wording of this legal document is left unchanged and 67 years after its adop-
tion the Statute remains the defining document for the agency’s mandate.8 
This raises questions related to rules of interpretation and methodological 
choices within international refugee law. In order to shed light on these 
questions, the aim of this thesis is to describe and analyse how the meaning 
of ‘international protection’ in the UNHCR’s Statute has evolved over time. 
As such, the overall research question is: 
How has the meaning of ‘international protection’ in the UNHCR 
Statute evolved over time? 
In order to capture how the meaning of ‘international protection’ has 
changed, I need to establish a point of reference. As such, the following sub-
question requires an answer: 
How was ‘international protection’ understood at the time of adop-
tion of the UNHCR Statute? 
Furthermore, as will be explained in Section 1.2 and 1.3, the world currently 
faces a protection crisis which has placed UNHCR under unprecedented 
pressure. In order to meet this crisis, there is a need to establish what exactly 
UNHCR’s responsibilities are. Because UNHCR is bound by its Statute the 
current interpretation of ‘international protection’ brings us one step closer 
to mapping the international legal obligations of UNHCR. Consequently, 
the final sub-question is: 
How is ‘international protection’ in the UNHCR Statute understood 
today? 
A focus on the interpretation of ‘international protection’ in UNHCR’s 
mandate, as opposed to for example the implementation, requires the 
maintenance of a legal focus. Thus, this thesis maps how both new sources 
of international law and new approaches to interpretation have shaped the 
understanding of ‘international protection’ over time. By interpreting the 
UNHCR Statute in light of the legal sources available in 1950 and tracking 
how the interpretation of ‘international protection’ has evolved up until to-
                                                 




day I seek to come closer to what lays at the core of UNHCR’s statutory 
international legal responsibilities. 
 
1.2  Introducing the international refugee protection regime 
1.2.1 Key concepts 
The lack or denial of protection is arguably the defining characteristic of 
being a refugee.9 Grahl-Madsen describes a refugee as “a person who is not 
being given the protection which a State normally may give its nationals”.10 
As such, the lack of protection relates to the relationship between the refu-
gee and its state of origin. According to the UNHCR Statute, a person is 
entitled to refugee status if 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country (…) Stateless persons may also be 
refugees in this sense, where country of origin (citizenship) is understood as 
“country of former habitual residence.
11
 
Hathaway argues that “[r]efugee status is a categorical designation that re-
flects a unique ethical and consequential legal entitlement to make claims on 
the international community”. As noted in Section 1.1, the entitlements of 
refugees largely depend on the interpretation of ‘protection’. 
The international refugee protection regime is understood as the set 
of norms, rules, principles, and decision-making processes grounded in ref-
ugee law, human rights law and general principles of international law 
which regulate the behaviour of States and other autonomous legal personal-
ities in regards to refugees.12 The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 
                                                 
9 Goodwin-Gill, 1989, 6, UNHCR, Note on International Protection, 7 September 1994, 
para. 11 and Helton, 2003, 19-33. 
10 Grahl-Madsen, 1966, 98-99. For an analysis of the refugee as the object of surrogate 
protection, see i.e Kneebone, 2014, 98-121. 
11 UNHCR Statute. It should be noted that this definition differs from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol on that these documents also include “membership of a 
particular social group” in grounds for seeking protection. Furthermore, the UNHCR Stat-
ute includes a provision giving refugee status to person falling within the mandate of previ-
ous refugee agencies, see article 6 i). 
12 This definition is based on Betts, Milner and Loescher, 2008, 2 and Deschamp and 





Protocol and the UNHCR Statute form the “two pillars” of the regime13 
which jointly express the core principles on which the international protec-
tion of refugees are built.14 These pillars aim to balance the inherent conflict 
between principles of state sovereignty and territorial supremacy on the one 
hand, and humanitarian norms of protection on the other.15 Arguably, this 
conflict of interests characterises the international refugee protection regime 
and causes it to be deeply politicized and – arguably – incomplete.16 It is 
within this contested legal space on the international plane that the interpre-
tation of UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international protection’ takes 
place. The politics of refugee protection adds a challenging dimension to the 
interpretation of the legal responsibility of UNHCR and raises intricate 
questions as to what is law and what is policy. 
In order to understand the international refugee protection regime, 
one needs to separate between providing ‘international protection’ and ‘state 
protection’. Both concepts relate to remedying the legal situation of the ref-
ugee. However, the terms suggest different types of protection. The distinc-
tion between the two was highlighted by UNHCR’s in its response to EU 
legislation that applied the concept of ‘international protection’ to protection 
accorded by an EU Member State: 
While acknowledging that this use of the term is common, UNHCR would like to 
point out that from an international law perspective, international protection is the 
protection that the international community accords to individuals or groups 
through special organs and mechanisms. The regime of international refugee pro-
tection exists independently of any State having accepted responsibility to protect 
the refugee in question. In conformity with paragraphs 1 and 8 of the Statute of 
UNHCR, adopted by General Assembly resolution 428(V) of 1950, the responsi-
                                                                                                                            
der international law, as this, in my view, highlights the role UNHCR holds in the interna-
tional production of norms within refugee law. While the term ‘regime’ typically belongs to 
studies of international relations, scholars of international law applies the term to describe 
the legal framework within a specific sphere on the international plane. Despite of ‘regime’ 
being a reoccurring concept in work by international refugee law scholar, it not often de-
fined. Alternatively, one could use ‘the refugee law regime’, however, this, in my view, 
excludes actors and focuses solely on the law. For both uses in one text, see i.e 
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, 2015. 
13 Einarsen, 2011, 40. 
14 Türk, Nicholson and Feller, 2003, 6. 
15 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007, preface and 1 and Loescher, 2001, 2. 




bility for providing international protection to refugees lies with the High Com-
missioner for Refugees.17  
The quote reminds us that ‘international protection’ is something qualita-
tively different from ‘state protection’. While the latter is dependent on 
States accepting responsibility to protect refugees, the former establishes a 
parallel and autonomous mechanism under the international community as a 
whole. In sum, UNHCR concludes that  
the protection that States extend to refugees is not, properly speaking, ‘internation-
al protection’, but national protection extended in the performance of an interna-
tional obligation. This form of national protection is better described, in UNHCR’s 
view, as ‘asylum’.18 
Briefly stated, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol regu-
lates ‘state protection’ provided by states, while the 1950 UNHCR Statute 
regulates ‘international protection’ provided by UNHCR.19 One major point 
in this regard is that the institutional responsibility of the UNHCR extends 
to every person falling under the refugee definition in Article 6 of the 
UNHCR Statute. It is the legal responsibility of UNHCR to provide ‘inter-
national protection’ to refugees that will the focus in the following chapters. 
 
1.2.2 UNHCR’s mandate and its autonomous legal personality 
According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),  
international organizations are subjects of international law, and, as such, are 
bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of internation-
al law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they 
are parties.20  
If we accept the premise that UNHCR holds an autonomous legal personali-
ty under international law, the organisation is legally responsible under in-
                                                 
17 UNHCR, UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s proposal for a Council 
Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals 
and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection. 
2001/0207, 12 September 2001, para. 9-10. 
18 Ibid., para. 15 and 16. 
19 1951 Refugee Convention does not include neither a right to seek nor an obligation to 
provide asylum. This will be touched upon in Section 4.5. 
20 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 




ternational law to fulfil its mandate, as defined in the UNHCR Statute.21 
But, as pointed out above, there is no universal consensus on what ‘interna-
tional protection’ actually obligates UNHCR to do. Furthermore, as was 
made clear in Section 1.1, how UNHCR has executed its mandate has 
evolved significantly over time. Thus, as put by Stevens, "seeking to under-
stand what we mean by 'protection' is not simply an exercise in academic 
analysis with little relevance to the real world; it has significant practical 
implications".22 
‘State protection’ and ‘international protection’ are closely connect-
ed and often build on each other. Thus, one could say that there is an inter-
dependence between the functions of the UNHCR and the responsibilities of 
States. As highlighted by Goodwin-Gill; 
UNHCR has been accorded a functional role and responsibility by the international 
community, but possesses neither territory nor jurisdiction. Yet it is on the territory 
of States and within their jurisdiction, that the practical problems of protection, as-
sistance and solutions must be worked out.
23  
No State is obligated to admit UNHCR to its territory. In order to remedy 
this obstacle to provide ‘international protection’ to refugees, UNHCR fre-
quently forms partnerships with states through cooperation agreements, of-
ten through a so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). These 
agreements permit the agency physical presence in a given country.24 As the 
UNHCR quote from 2017 illustrates, and under the function of providing 
‘international protection’ to refugees, the agency delivers services spanning 
from emergency aid, to food and medical assistance, building schools and 
protecting the environment. Clearly, these services are being delivered with-
in the territories of sovereign states. Zieck points to an important challenge 
in defining the meaning of ‘international protection’ that arises when 
UNHCR “is co-acting in the same territory [as States] and engages in tasks 
that appear to stretch far beyond those originally entrusted to it”. She asks a 
                                                 
21 For a deliberation on the question of UNHCR’s autonomous legal personality under 
international law where it is concluded conformingly, see e.i Janmyr, 2014, 229-237 and 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007, 430. For the opposite, see e.i; Venzke, 2012, who con-
cludes that “UNHCR is not itself an international organization but part of the UN” and as 
such, not an autonomous legal personality, 76-87, 78. 
22 Stevens, 2013, 234. 
23 Goodwin-Gill, 1989, 13. 




timely question: “Where does [state] protection end and international pro-
tection begin?”25 
 In sum, the international refugee protection regime consists of 
mechanisms that regulate both state behaviour and UNHCR protection re-
sponsibilities towards refugees. While the scope of ‘state protection’ varies, 
UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international protection’ applies to all per-
sons that fall within the Statute. What this mandate actually obligates 
UNHCR to do, however, is less certain and appears to evolve over time. 
This is the topic of the thesis.  
As emphasised above, the international protection regime is highly 
politicized, and while adopting the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1950 
UNHCR Statute to curb the interests of sovereign states in order to protect 
those of refugees, protection efforts are not left unchallenged. The next sec-
tion places UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ mandate into a contempo-
rary context – the so-called refugee crisis. 
 
1.3 Contextualization: the international refugee protection regime in 
crisis? 
 
(W)e have been largely failing. Failing the long-suffering people of Syria, in not 
ending the war in its infancy. Failing others in now-chronic conflict zones, for the 
same reason. Failing millions of migrants who deserve far more than lives marked 
by cradle-to-grave indignity and desperation. It is shameful that the victims of 
abominable crimes should be made to suffer further by our failures to give them 
protection.26 
 
The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ra’ad Al Hussein, gives voice 
to understandable frustration with an apparently malfunctioning internation-
al refugee protection system. From a legal perspective, whether we have 
failed to offer ‘protection’ to the many millions of people whom according 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 324. 





to UNHCR are currently forcedly displaced largely depends on how we de-
fine ‘protection’. 
Due to the longstanding conflicts in Afghanistan, the Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Yemen and 
Central America, in addition to the more recent conflicts in Syria, Burundi, 
Libya, Niger and Nigeria, the international refugee protection regime has 
come under unprecedented pressure since 2015.27 Currently, an overwhelm-
ing 63.9 million are defined as ‘people of concern’ to UNHCR.28 At the 
same time, the inherent conflict between state sovereignty and refugee pro-
tection has sharpened. By focusing on numbers and the need for control, 
states legitimize the shrinking of the existing legal protection framework 
and the implementation of deterrence policies.29 Because UNHCR’s man-
date applies to all refugees independently of whether its host states recog-
nise their status as refugees or not, the agency’s ability to provide ‘interna-
tional protection’ is seemingly pushed to the limit. One should also keep in 
mind that major refugee hosting states such as Lebanon and Jordan have 
ratified neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, while 
Turkey has done so with significant reservations. Furthermore, 86 per cent 
of the refugees entitled to ‘international protection’ under UNHCR are lo-
cated in developing countries with limited resources available. These factors 
all contribute to a situation UNHCR now refers to as a ‘protection crisis’.30 
 
1.4 Previous work on UNHCR and ‘international protection’ 
A complete analysis of how the meaning of ‘international protection’ has 
evolved over time, from the time of the Statute’s adoption in 1950 and up 
until today is yet to be written. Nevertheless, this thesis will be drawing on a 
useful body of research on UNHCR’s role within the international refugee 
                                                 
27 Refugees, 2016b, 6. 
28 Within the 63.9 million we find refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless, internally-displaced 
people (IDPs) and returnees. Returnees, stateless and IDPs are covered by other legal 
mechanisms. It should also be noted that Palestinian refugees are not included, as they fall 
within the mandate of UNRWA. 
29 Refugees, , 34. 




protection regime and on accounts of ‘international protection’ related to a 
specific period. 
A significant contribution to understanding the drafting process lead-
ing up to the adoption of the UNHCR Statute is made by Louise Holborn in 
‘Refugees. A Problem of Our Time’. While the account is especially valua-
ble in understanding the purpose and objectives behind UNHCR’s ‘interna-
tional protection’ mandate, it has been criticized for its lack of analysis and 
interpretation31 and as such, should be supplemented with other sources of 
the drafting history. 
Important contributions to understanding UNHCR’s mandate within 
the international refugee protection regime have been made by scholars of 
international relations, and it is interesting to note that legal scholars draw 
extensively on key works coming from this discipline. For instance, Gil Lo-
escher and Alexander Betts have analysed UNHCR’s role as an internation-
al actor in international politics and highlighted the fundamental challenges 
faced by UNHCR in fulfilling its mandate due to its dependency on State 
funding and private donors.32 However, while international relations offers a 
highly relevant perspective on UNHCR and its mandate to provide ‘interna-
tional protection’, legal shortcuts are sometimes made to illustrate a bigger 
point. For example, Loescher simply states that the 1950 UNHCR Statute 
“sets out a clear mandate, defining the scope and role of the organization”.33 
This stands in sharp contrast to a legal reading of the Statute, which is repre-
sented well by a quote from Marjoleine Zieck; “while the meaning of [dura-
ble] solutions are comparatively straight forward, the meaning of the func-
tion of providing international protection is much less so”.34 Moreover, be-
cause scholars of international relations use UNHCR as a case to investigate 
phenomenon in power relations and structural premises on the international 
plane, changes in the interpretation of the agency’s mandate does not re-
quire the same degree of critical assessment as it would in a legal analysis. 
As such, there is a need to supplement these works with one that focuses on 
                                                 
31 Copeland, 1997, 503 
32 See e.g Loescher, 2001, Betts, Milner and Loescher, 2008, Betts and Loescher, 2011 
33 Loescher, 2014, 215. 




the legal responsibility that flows from the interpretation of ‘international 
protection’. 
 In terms of defining ‘international protection’, many authors have 
contributed with enlightening deliberations on the meaning of the concept. 
Paul Weis, former chief legal advisors at UNHCR, provided one of the first 
accounts of the term. He held that “international protection of refugees pur-
ports to remedy the situation created by the fact that they lack the protection 
which is usually afforded to nationals abroad by the state of nationality”35 
and describes ‘international protection’ as both complementary to, and in-
dependent of, the protection accorded to refugees by the refugee hosting 
state. In contrast to ‘state protection’, Weis argued that the ‘international 
protection’ offered by refugee organizations had never been limited to the 
protection of already established rights. Thus, according to Weis, 
[t]he promotion of the rights of refugees, the improvement of their legal status by 
means of the establishment of international instruments or the enactment of appro-
priate municipal legislation, have always been an important part of their function. 
Apparently, the particular precariousness of the legal position of refugees, the 
vagueness of their position in international law, has led to the inclusion of this re-
formatory task in the mandate of the various international bodies.
36
 
This is often framed as ‘legal protection’, because it grounds the mandate in 
the rights of refugees expressed in either existing or in future sources of law. 
Similar to Weis, Grahl-Madsen also highlights ‘international protection’ as 
a function to strengthen the rights and legal status of refugees. In sum, he 
argues that 
the word 'protection' denotes measures of some kind or other taken by a subject of 
international law in order to safeguard or promote the integrity, rights, or interests 
of an individual. Protection may take many shapes. We may do distinguish be-
tween internal protection (“the protection of the Law”) and external protection 
(diplomatic or consular protection etc). Moreover, protection may be active or pas-
sive.37 
The terms ‘diplomatic’ and ‘consular protection’ understood the mandate of 
UNHCR as to fill the role a state would normally fill if one of its citizens 
                                                 
35 Weis, 1954, 218. 
36 Ibid., 220. 




were in need of legal support abroad. Today, and as illustrated in Section 
1.1, ‘international protection’ seems to be interpreted in a substantially dif-
ferent way. As such, the contributions made by Weis and Grahl-Madsen are 
necessary to understand the starting point from where ‘international protec-
tion’ started to evolve but are no longer sufficient in mapping the interna-
tional legal responsibilities of UNHCR. 
Dallal Stevens has contributed significantly to disentangling the con-
cepts of ‘protection’ in general and of ‘international protection’ in particu-
lar. She argues that protection might be regarded as positive obligations 
resting on both hosts states and UNHCR, but interestingly observers that the 
actual ‘international protection’ measures undertaken by UNHCR are not of 
one universal standard. In sum, she claims that “where the UNHCR is fun-
damental to the provision of protection, the context will again matter”,38 
meaning that how UNHCR executes its mandate to provide ‘international 
protection’ will depend on a range of different factors. While this might not 
seem problematic or surprising, it tells us that the meaning of ‘international 
protection’ not only evolves over time but also that it evolves according to 
context. When planning “action on the ground”, UNHCR interprets its man-
date as flowing from the Statute legal sources such as MoUs, refugee law 
and policy, human rights, humanitarianism and development approaches in 
addition to guidance on how to interpret the Statute.39 To some extent, Ste-
vens questions whether the results of this evolutionary interpretation are in 
line with the statutory mandate of UNHCR. Nevertheless, her focus seems 
lay on the contemporary conceptual level of ‘international protection’ and 
on how the language applied by UNHCR contributes to the confusion as to 
the actual meaning of ‘international protection’. Stevens notes that ‘interna-
tional protection’ is often used simply as a term to describe the activities 
undertaken by UNHCR40 – a point also made in the recent contribution by 
Puggioni. In Puggioni’s view, “the lack of clarity is often conflated with the 
concept of assistance to the point that refugee protection tends to refer to 
any policies for refugees, irrespective of the ultimate outcome”.41 This rais-
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es serious concerns in regards of UNHCR’s accountability towards the enti-
tlements of refugees. Presumably, it must be possible to define a legal base-
line standard from which UNHCR cannot depart over time nor space. Cur-
rently, it seems like UNHCR is left with considerable latitude to orient ‘in-
ternational protection’ in a direction of its own choosing. 
 
1.5 Scope and limitation of thesis 
Analysing how the meaning of ‘international protection’ in Article 1 of the 
1950 UNHCR Statute has evolved over time requires a de lege lata analysis 
of how the concept has been interpreted within different epochs in the inter-
national refugee protection regime. This is an ambitious project. Due to 
time, space and practical limitations, coupled with a wish to spare the reader 
from too many details, I focus the analysis on interpretation developments 
that represent the most marked departures from, or additions to, previous 
practices. 
When discussing the legal responsibilities of UNHCR, one should 
keep in mind that the refugee protection framework derived from the 1951 
Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol and the 1950 UNHCR Statute could 
be supplemented by protection mechanisms found in other spheres of inter-
national law. This is reflected in the definition of the international refugee 
protection regime used in this thesis which includes norms derived from 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, all of 
which constitute legal sources that entitle refugees to some form of protec-
tion42 Within this legal complexity, a myriad of protection-related concepts 
has evolved. In addition to ‘international protection’ and ‘state protection’, 
‘temporary protection, 'surrogate protection', 'complementary protection’, 
‘preventive protection’, 'humanitarian protection', 'protection space', and 
‘diplomatic protection’, can all be related to refugee protection in one way 
or the other. While UNHCR’s legal responsibility towards refugees might 
be grounded in some or all of these sources of law, this thesis focuses spe-
cifically on the responsibility to provide ‘international protection’ grounded 
in UNHCR Statute Article 1. 
                                                 




 As within all fields of international public law, state acceptance is 
key when it comes to the evolution of refugee law. Due to the inherent con-
flict between state sovereignty and refugee protection within this legal 
sphere, international political and economic interests constitute major con-
cerns when states decide how UNHCR’s mandate is to evolve. As such, it is 
not always possible to keep a strict separation between refugee policy and 
refugee law. That being said, questions of realpolitik will only be mentioned 
when this adds to the understanding of interpretation practices.43 
 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
The thesis consists in three parts and seven chapters. Part I: research ques-
tion, contextualization and methodology provides essential knowledge in 
analysing how the meaning of ‘international protection’ has evolved over 
time, and places the research question in a contemporary context. The con-
clusions reached in this thesis largely flow from the answers to challenging 
questions related to methodology and sources of law. I address this in Chap-
ter 2. Part II: The evolving meaning of ‘international protection’ starts off 
with Chapter 3, which introduces the legal situation of refugee prior to the 
adoption of the UNHCR Statute and highlights key institutional and legal 
developments that define the origins of ‘international protection’. This chap-
ter provides us with insights that will be drawn upon in the de lege lata 
analysis of how ‘international protection’ was interpreted at the time of 
adopting the UNHCR Statute. This will be the topic of Chapter 4. The con-
clusions reached in Chapter 4 equips us to assess how the meaning of ‘inter-
national protection’ evolved over time. Chapter 5 handles the timeframe 
1950 to 1980, while 1980-2017 is dealt with in Chapter 6. Part III: Findings 
and concluding remarks is made up by the thesis’ seventh and final chapter 
and draws together the key findings of each chapter and offers concluding 
remarks. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology and legal sources 
2.1 Introductory reflections  
In any situation of legal interpretation, your specific background from a giv-
en legal culture necessarily affects how you understand the legal sources at 
hand.44 By asking how the meaning of ‘international protection’ in the 
UNHCR Statute has evolved over time, I need to analyse legal sources estab-
lished over a timespan of almost 70 years. This requires reflection on my 
own position in the contemporary legal culture to identify possible biases I 
might have as interpreter. For instance, international human rights protec-
tion has evolved radically since the drafting of the UNHCR Statute,45 which 
should not be reflected in the reading of ‘international protection’ in the 
1950 context. Acknowledging the challenge is a first step in avoiding any 
inclination towards bringing subjective and contextual premises into the 
interpretation process.46 Nevertheless, there is a need to recognize that the 
researcher will always make choices. This inclination is presumably sub-
dued by strictly observing and providing justification of the conclusions 
reached throughout the process.47 In the following sections, I address ques-
tions of methodology and legal sources in order to establish a framework for 
interpretation. 
 
2.2 Interpreting the 1950 UNHCR Statute 
In December 1950, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed 
Resolution 428 (V) with the UNHCR Statute attached as an annex. Ground-
ed in UN Charter (UNC) Article 22,48 UNHCR became a subsidiary organ 
of UN. UNGA resolutions are normally non-binding on states, and, as a 
result, the UNHCR Statue is not considered treaty law.49 In practice, this 
entails that only UNHCR is party to the Statute. Another key feature with 
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the UNHCR Statute is its status as a constituent instrument. As typical of 
constituent instruments, the UNHCR Statue defines the agency’s mandate 
and places it in a structural hierarchy within the UN system.50  
When asking how the meaning of ‘international protection’ in the 
UNHCR Statute has evolved over time, one first needs to answer the fun-
damental question of what rules of interpretation apply for the Statute. 
According to ICJ, the general rules of interpretation as expressed in 
Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
hold status as international customary law.51 It is widely accepted that these 
are applicable even in cases when the treaty at hand was drafted before 
VCLT.52 Moreover, ICJ has expressed that the customary rules of interpre-
tation also applies to constituent instruments of international organisations, 
if the instrument at hand is a treaty.53 As already noted, and in contrast to 
what is the case for the majority of international organisations, the constitu-
ent instrument of UNHCR is not a treaty, but in fact a resolution.54 Presum-
ably, the UNHCR Statute needs to be interpreted in line with rule of resolu-
tion interpretation. 
The question then, is how a resolution of international organisations 
should be interpreted. As pointed out by Michael Wood, little attention has 
been paid to this issue.55 Tellingly, none of the standard works on interna-
tional law in general, and the law of international organisations in particular, 
elaborate on this issue. A natural explanation might be that most resolutions 
are non-binding political instruments. Hence the need for rules of interpreta-
tion is less pressing than with binding treaties.56 Although there seems to be 
some agreement on applying a more flexible approach when interpreting 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 442. 
51 See e.g: Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina/Chile) 52 ILR 93. 
52 Aust, 2007, 10. 
53 Certain Expenses of the UN, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 157. See also, Article 5, Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
54 Sands and Klein, 2001, 442. 
55 C. Wood, 1998, 73. 
56 However, it should be noted that resolutions in specific circumstance could be argued to 
embody a consensus of opinion about what is law, and indirectly, thus become evidence of 
law, see i.e Sands and Klein, 2001, 29. Furthermore, the literature recognises that what is 
categorised as a resolution might in fact be a treaty, ref. “the nature of the resolution deter-
mines if it is considered binding on States”, United Nations, 2017. See i.g Oppenheim, 




political instruments, there is no codification of rules of resolution interpre-
tation.57 The question then, is where this leaves us.  
Wood argues that it is necessary to examine the particular nature of 
the instrument at hand in order to establish a framework of interpretation 
suitable for the particular instrument.58 The atypical nature of the UNHCR 
Statute, being both a constituent instrument and the result of a resolution, 
makes the process of identifying its particular nature somewhat challenging. 
The question seems unresolved in both case law and relevant literature. Il-
lustrative in this regard is the account in Bowett’s Law of International In-
stitutions, were it is simply stated that “[t]he constituent instrument of an 
international organisations is almost always a treaty”, whereupon recourse 
to VCLT is made without mentioning alternative interpretational rules for 
non-treaty constituent instruments.59 
Applying the general rules of treaty interpretation to the UNHCR 
Statute would fit well within an already established tradition of constituent 
instrument interpretation. However, one could argue that applying rules ex-
pressed in Article 31 and 32 removes the flexibility that is traditionally kept 
when interpreting resolutions. In the specific case of the Statue, the need for 
flexibility might not be as strong due to the ‘non-political’ clause of Article 
2 in the Statute.60 One could rather argue that the UNHCR Statute shares 
similarities with a treaty, in so far as it places legal rights and duties on sub-
jects of international law, which is the defining feature of a treaty.61 Alt-
hough according to the definition, a treaty must consist of more than one 
party,62 it could be argued that the act of establishing UNHCR is based on 
an ‘element of agreement’ between States, and therefor can be seen as shar-
ing certain key characterises with treaties.63 To be specific; when UN mem-
ber states adopted Resolution 428 (V) and established the UNHCR it created 
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an autonomous legal person in an act that could be described as an act of 
state to “’contract out’ a given general regime of international law on the 
basis of their sovereign autonomy”.64 To be specific, UNGA entrusted 
UNHCR with the role of providing ‘international protection’ to refugee on 
behalf of the international community. In conclusion, the UNHCR Statute 
shares significant features with that of a treaty which – in my view – serves 
as an argument to abide by the general rules of treaty interpretation. 
Lastly, objectives of coherence and predictability within the interna-
tional refugee protection regime leads us to applying the rules derived from 
the VCLT Article 31 and 32 because the 1951 Refugee Convention, being a 
treaty, has to be interpreted on that basis. On the same note, it could also be 
added that the UNC from which UNHCR derives its authority is categorised 
by ICJ as a treaty, although with “certain special characteristics”,65 and 
therefore is to be interpreted in accordance with Article 31 and 32. By ap-
plying the same rules of interpretation as applies to other constituent instru-
ments, to the UNC, and to the 1951 Refugee Convention, we create a sys-
tem of coherent interpretation practice which is both logical and stable.  In 
my view, it would seem somewhat unsatisfactory to develop a parallel 
framework of interpretation to apply on the UNHCR Statute when valid 
arguments point us to the general rules of interpretation within international 
law. 
As will be explained in Section 2.3.2, the doctrine of implied powers 
allows for a flexibility within the Article 31 and 32 interpretation frame-
work, which arguably pays due consideration to the resolution aspect of the 
Statute. However, first, we establish as our point of departure the general 
rules of treaty interpretation as expressed in VCLT Article 31 and 32. 
 
2.3 Principles of interpretation  
2.3.1 General rules of interpretation based on VCLT 31 and 32 
In line with the general rules of treaty interpretation expressed in VCLT 
Article 31.1, the UNHCR Statute shall be interpreted in “good faith in ac-
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cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.66 According to the 
VCLT Article 31.2, ‘context’ for the purpose of interpretation shall be un-
derstood as “the text, including its preamble and annexes” along with, 
amongst others, “any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other par-
ties as an instrument related to the treaty”.67 
Whether there is a hierarchy between “the ordinary meaning”, “the 
context” and “its objectives and purpose” is subject to some dispute. Aust 
argues that in order to give effect to the expressed intention of the drafters 
the ordinary meaning cannot be read in the abstract but in relation to their 
context.68 ICJ has expressed that “if the relevant words in their natural and 
ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is the end to the mat-
ter”,69 implying that the objective and purpose is to be left out if this would 
alter a perfectly sensible result of interpretation of the ordinary meaning in 
light of its context. This position, Oppenheim argues, “is (…) of limited 
usefulness”. In his view, the question of whether the meaning of a treaty text 
is clear or not is the result of the whole process of interpretation, not a start-
ing point to assess the other factors of interpretation.70 Such a view finds 
support in the fact that Article 31 is entitled ‘General rule of interpretation’ 
thus emphasising – with its use of a singular noun – that the article is ex-
pressing one rule. Consequently, if read literally, all three elements are to be 
considered when interpreting the UNHCR Statute.71 Furthermore, this 
would also imply that other instruments made in connection with the con-
clusion of the UNHCR Statute and accepted by the other parties as an in-
strument related to the treaty should be given due consideration when inter-
preting the meaning of ‘international protection’. That does not mean, how-
ever, that all elements must be granted equal weight in reaching a conclu-
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sion. The interpretation process is fundamentally about determining what 
sources are relevant in uncovering the parties’ intentions and what weight 
each of these are to be given in the final subsumption.72  
The above account marks our point of departure for the analysis of 
how ‘international protection’ was interpreted at the time of adoption of the 
UNHCR Statute, which is the topic addressed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, in 
this chapter, “relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties”73 will also be taken into account. 
Article 32 permits recourse to supplementary means of interpreta-
tion, either to “confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 
31”, or to “determine the meaning of the interpretation according Article 31 
leaves the meaning ambiguous.”74 The list of supplementary means of inter-
pretation include ‘preparatory work’ and the ‘circumstances of its conclu-
sion’, but, and as will be explained below, the list is not exhaustive. In 
Chapter 3, I describe the origins of ‘international protection’ and the cir-
cumstances of the drafting of the UNHCR Statute. This account is closely 
linked to Section 4.3.1, where parts of the preparatory work are assessed. As 
the category preparatory work comprises a wide range of sources, I focus 
the analysis on selected minutes of formal negotiations and sessions.75 As a 
general rule, value and relevance of preparatory work vary according to fac-
tors such as the type of legal instrument at hand, what the subject matter of 
the instrument is and the degree of clear indications of the parties’ intentions 
expressed in the available documents.76 Furthermore, preparatory work 
should be judged by its authenticity, completeness and availability.77 Ques-
tions specific to preparatory work analysed in this thesis will be addressed 
in Section 4.3.1. 
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As already mentioned, the list of supplementary means of interpreta-
tion in Article 32 is not exhaustive.78 When used to “confirm” the meaning 
according to Article 31 one can add other sources than the ones already dis-
cussed. In the case of interpreting the UNHCR Statute, so-called acquies-
cence is relevant. Acquiescence is applied to describe the situation that oc-
curs if a party, for instance UNHCR, communicates its understanding of the 
meaning of ‘international protection’, and applies this meaning in its activi-
ties without objections being made by UNGA. This might be considered a 
tacit approval of this specific interpretation and could be argued to represent 
the authoritative interpretation of the Statute. Supplementary means of in-
terpretation are central to the discussions of Chapter 5 and 6.  
Other important sources in Chapter 5 and 6 are “subsequent agree-
ment between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions” and “subsequent practice in the application of 
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its inter-
pretation”, which according to Article 31.3 are to be taken into account in 
the interpretation process.79 This suggests that the meaning of ‘international 
protection’ might be subject to change. International jurisprudence confirms 
that Article 31.3 is to be applied in this way, and as will become evident in 
Chapter 5 and 6, this is highly relevant in understanding how and why the 
meaning of ‘international protection’ has evolved over time. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, relevant rules of international law are legitimate means of 
interpretation. As international law evolves constantly, this source of inter-
pretation could also affect the subsequent interpretation of a treaty. As a 
general rule, any treaty is presumably intended to be in accordance with 
existing international law.80 Indeed, if evolution within relevant legal cul-
tures of international law takes place, this could affect the interpretation of 
an instrument of international law. In the Namibia case, ICJ held that; 
Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accord-
ance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is 
bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the 
Covenant – "the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and "the well-being 
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and development" of the peoples concerned – were not static, but were by defini-
tion evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the "sacred trust". The par-
ties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. 
That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into considera-
tion the changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its in-
terpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, 
through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreo-
ver, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.
81
 
The above quoted case illustrates that the interpretation of the UNHCR 
Statute necessarily will adapt in light of the evolution of the legal frame-
work of the international refugee protection regime as a whole. As such, the 
weight accorded to the Statute’s preparatory work and the circumstances of 
its conclusion might decrease over time due to their status as supplementary 
means of interpretation. 
In sum, the general rules of treaty interpretation expressed in VCLT 
Article 31 and 32 establish a dynamic framework for interpreting UNHCR’s 
mandate to provide ‘international protection’ as expressed in Article 1 of the 
UNHCR Statute, though there should be no doubt that ordinary meaning, 
the textual context and its object and purpose is the absolute cornerstone of 
interpretation. The next section briefly introduces the doctrine of implied 
powers – an approach to interpretation related to the question of evolution-
ary interpretation as discussed above, although specifically in regards to 
international organizations. 
 
2.3.2 Implied powers 
To be sure, this section does not aim to present a new approach to interpre-
tation, distinct from the general rules expressed in VCLT. The doctrine of 
implied powers can be traced back to the ‘Repatriations’ case, where ICJ 
stated that the UN “must be deemed to have those powers which, though not 
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary impli-
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cation as being essential to the performance of its duties”.82 The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has followed suit and concluded that interpretation 
allows for the international organisation to be granted those powers neces-
sary to “safeguard its prerogatives”.83 This approach to interpreting a con-
stituent instrument has also been branded as the doctrine of effectiveness. In 
the ‘Effect of Awards’ case, ICJ found that General Assembly could estab-
lish an administrative tribunal if “it was essential to ensure the effective 
working of the secretariat” and clarified that “capacity to this arises by nec-
essary intendent out of the Charter”.84 Skubiszewski describes the doctrine 
as a method to “read into the organization’s statute not in order to modify it 
or add to the members’ burdens, but in order to give effect to what they 
agreed by becoming parties to the constitutional treaty”.85 Stated differently; 
when the express powers of an organisation, that is, the powers one can read 
from the principles of interpretation derived from VCLT Article 31 and 32, 
are perceived as insufficient to meet the intentions of the drafters, the doc-
trine of implied powers/doctrine of effectiveness are invoked as a tool for 
extension.86 The general rule of interpretation defines clear limits to this 
approach, and requires the effectiveness to be grounded in the objective and 
purpose of the instrument at hand. This could be referred to as a ‘teleologi-
cal approach’ to interpretation.87 In essence; 
The doctrine of effectiveness is thus not to be thought of as justifying a liberal in-
terpretation going beyond what the text of the treaty justifies. Effectiveness is rela-
tive to the objective and purpose of the treaty, a decision as to which will normally 
first have to be made.
88
 
As we shall see, the doctrine of implied powers and effectiveness is of con-
siderable importance to the evolution of ‘international protection’ in the 
UNHCR Statute. 
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2.4 Primary sources of interpretation 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Since 1950, an enormous amount of various sources has been added to in-
ternational refugee protection regime which now constitutes a comprehen-
sive body of law.89 These sources will be addressed in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Some of the sources hold status as international law – so-called ‘hard law’ – 
while others could be framed as ‘soft law’. A third category that does not 
hold status as law, but nevertheless feeds into the regime is political in na-
ture and could be categorised as ‘policy’. The categorization of these 
sources is of great importance to the interpretation of ‘international protec-
tion’ in the UNHCR Statute in so far as their status determines the weight 
they are accorded. However, what will become evident in these chapters is 
the deeply politicised nature of international refugee law, which often makes 
it challenging to separate the three categories from each other. Legal inter-
pretation in this sphere of international law is political. Arguably, interpreta-
tion of ‘international protection’ within the international refugee protection 
regime could be described as a semantic struggle where states and UNHCR 
develop their legal interpretation in an attempt to implement meanings into 
‘international protection’ that are aligned with their convictions or inter-
ests.90 
The international refugee protection regime embodies a plethora of 
sources that deals with the meaning of ‘international protection’. It is far 
beyond the intentions of this thesis to address them all.  In the next sub-
section, I introduce what I view as the principal, relevant sources in as-
sessing “the standing of UNHCR”.91 
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2.4.2 UNGA resolutions and ECOSOC recommendations 
According to article 3 of the UNHCR Statute, UNHCR “shall follow policy 
directives given him by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social 
Council”. Based on the ordinary understanding of “shall”, it is clear that 
resolutions passed by either of these organs have binding force on UNHCR. 
As a result, these are highly relevant sources when interpreting ‘internation-
al protection’ and its evolution over time. 
 
2.4.3 ExCom Conclusions 
More important to the day to day activities of UNHCR, however, are the 
conclusions adopted by the ExCom.92 The ExCom was established in 1958 
as a subsidiary organ of the ECOSOC and reports to UNGA. It replaced the 
United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF) and was mandated to “advise” the 
Office on its statutory “functions” and on “questions related to providing 
international assistance” in order to solve specific refugee problems, if the 
High Commissioner requested it to do so. The ExCom consists of States and 
representatives of specialized agencies that have been “elected by the Coun-
cil on the widest possible geographical basis from those States with a 
demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee prob-
lem”.93 
Today the ExCom regularly adopts ‘Conclusions on International’94 
protection regarding the interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 
1967 Protocol and on the UNHCR Statute.95 A lot could be said about the 
historic developments of the ExCom and its conclusions, however, due to 
space limitations, it is sufficient to state that its influence on the interpreta-
tion of UNHCR’s mandate has increased gradually and is now of considera-
ble importance.96 
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As noted above, the ExCom was intended to “advise” the UNHCR 
on its functions. From an ordinary understanding of the term it is not clear 
whether the advisory statements of ExCom have binding effect on UNHCR 
or not. In relation to States and the interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and its 1967 Protocol, there seems to be an overall consensus on 
considering these statements as non-binding.97 This could suggest that one 
should be somewhat reluctant in viewing ExCom conclusions as binding to 
the interpretation of the UNHCR Statute. However, as made clear inn Sec-
tion 2.2.1 when discussing the nature of the Statute, only UNHCR is bound 
by its provisions. In contrast to questions related to States’ legal obligations 
according to 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, issues of sov-
ereignty are not evoked when the Statue is interpreted. To the contrary; 
UNHCR is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, and in so far as the 
ExCom was established by the General Assembly specifically to advice the 
UNHCR there are no obvious legal challenges to a possible binding effect 
of ExCom interpretation of UNHCR ‘international protection’ mandate. The 
fact that UNGA established the ExCom with an exclusive and dedicated 
objective and purpose to advice UNHCR could imply that UNGA intended 
it to be binding. 
In resolution 1673 (XVI) of 1961, the General Assembly explicitly 
requested the High Commissioner for Refugees to “abide by directions” 
given by the ExCom on “situations concerning refugees”.98 Surely, how 
‘international protection’ is interpreted by UNHCR concerns the situation of 
refugees. However, from the wording in the resolution, it is not entirely 
clear if it is meant to apply to questions of interpreting UNHCR’s mandate. 
It seems plausible to conclude that the General Assembly meant to grant the 
ExCom with power to not only advise, but also bind the UNHCR. An ob-
servable shift in the practice of the ExCom following the resolution appears 
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to support this conclusion.99 The General Assembly repeated the message in 
a 1963 resolution, where it requested the High Commissioner to “continue 
to afford international protection to refugees (…) in conformity with the 
(…) directives of the Executive Committee”.100 As there is no doubt about 
the binding nature of UNGA resolutions on the practice of UNHCR, the 
agency is clearly bound by these resolutions.  
Due to its composition of representatives from governments with 
“demonstrated interest in, and devotion to the solution of the refugee prob-
lem” it could be argued that the ExCom has the legitimacy needed in terms 
of representation of the international refugee protection regime. Because the 
ExCom is an intergovernmental body, critics have argued that it is “not even 
nominally independent of the political will of states”.101 What implications 
this has on the legal authority of the conclusions passed by the ExCom, 
however, is not completely clear. Arguably, criticism like this raises valid 
concerns on the intentions of the ExCom members. However, the fact that it 
is states who adopt these conclusions actually gives them considerable 
weight, in so far as only states can create laws at the international plane. On 
the other hand, the weight of these interpretations might be restrained by 
accusations of member States violating fundamental cornerstones of the 
international refugee protection regimes, such as the principles of non-
refoulement. Accusations of the “lack of dedication to the common protec-
tion cause”102 and the “over-politicisation” of the conclusions103 contributes 
to the questioning of their legal authority. 
That being said, several observers point to UNHCR’s central role 
prior to the adoption of ExCom conclusion. In fact, Venzke argues that 
“[o]nly on the face of it does ExCom resemble an intergovernmental body 
where state delegates are in charge”.104 Indeed, he finds that the critical 
questions are discussed and settled by the UNHCR bureaucracy outside of 
ExCom meetings. Thus, state representatives are heavily influenced by 
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UNHCR itself.105 In spite of ExCom Conclusions being a result of a mixture 
of formal and informal decision making processes, they are oftentimes 
viewed to “document consensus of the international community”.106 In this 
regard, they arguably bear resemblances to what in Article 31 of the VCLT 
is termed “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-
tation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”.107 In any case, Ex-
Com conclusions could be said to represent practice confirming the interpre-
tation suggested by UNHCR, and as such, a legitimate source of interpreta-
tion according to VCLT Article 32. It is also worth noting that the ExCom is 
the only multilateral international forum that contributes to the development 
of international standards relating to refugees,108 and as such, inhibits spe-
cialised knowledge about the legal framework of the international refugee 
protection regime.109 Arguably, these characteristics serve to strengthen its 
significance in the interpretation of ‘international protection’. 
While there is some uncertainty as to how much legal authority one 
should give the ExCom conclusions, there is little doubt that the committee 
has considerable leverage to influence UNHCR on matters specifically re-
garding ‘international protection’. As a result, its conclusions are highly 
relevant when analysing the evolution of ‘international protection’ in 
UNHCR’s mandate.110 
 
2.4.4 UNHCR practice 
In Section 2.2.1 above, on the atypical nature of the UNHCR Statute, I ar-
gued that the creation of UNHCR entailed that the member states created an 
autonomous legal person by using their sovereign autonomy. Ahlborn de-
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scribes this as a conferral of powers that gives UNHCR a “distinct will”.111 
Ahlborn argues that 
It is this collective conferral of powers to a new legal person, and the correlative 
creation of an autonomous legal order, that decisively distinguishes the constituent 




Whether one frames it as ‘distinct will’ or not, it is clear that UNHCR is 
provided with a mandate and competency to create secondary law in form of 
resolutions, decisions, recommendations, declarations, guidelines, regula-
tions, directives or standards.113  
On a general level, this could hardly be categorized as law. Howev-
er, and as touched upon in Section 2.3.1, UNHCR’s interpretation of what 
‘international protection’ entails could become authoritative sources of in-
terpretation if UNGA gives a tacit approval. Furthermore, giving it more 
weight, UNGA, ECOSOC and ExCom could give their active approval to 
UNHCR’s interpretation by passing resolutions and conclusions based on 
the secondary law of UNHCR. As explained in Section 2.4.2, this is not 
uncommon. The Annual Reports of the High Commissioner and UNHCR’s 
Notes on International protection are the most central documents in shaping 
ExCom Conclusions and UNGA resolutions, and is the primary source of 
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Part II:  
The evolving meaning of ‘international 
protection’ 
 
Chapter 3: The origins of ‘international protection’ 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to answer how ‘international protection’ was interpreted at the time 
of adoption of the UNHCR Statute, it is essential to understand the context 
of its drafting. As explained in Section 2.3.1, VCLT Article 32 allows re-
course to the ‘circumstances of the conclusion’ of the UNHCR Statute if 
used as a supplementary element of interpretation to confirm the meaning 
reached in light of VCLT Article 31. This chapter offers a short introduction 
to the legal status of refugees prior to adoption of the 1950 UNHCR Statute 
and the 1951 Refugee Convention. In doing so, I seek to summarize key 
developments between 1921 and 1950. These represent the formative years 
of ‘international protection’ as a concept within the current international 
refugee protection regime and constitute the ‘circumstances of the conclu-
sion’ of the UNHCR Statute.  
 
3.2 The legal status of refugees in traditional international law 
In traditional international law, “states only and exclusively” were viewed 
as legal subjects.114 The individual was merely an object, with nationality 
functioning as the principal legal link between her and the international 
plane.115 In practice, this entailed that an individual abroad did not hold an 
autonomous legal status as a rights-bearing subject, but nevertheless en-
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joyed some sort of protection under international law by virtue of her status 
as a national of a legal subject, that is, another state.116 Recalling that the 
legal definition of a refugee, as presented in Section 1.2.1, consists in two 
core elements; 1) she is outside her state of origin and; 2) she has a well-
found fear of being persecuted. No longer enjoying protection by a nation-
state and at the same time being unable to invoke protection under interna-
tional law, refugees suffered from what Hannah Arendt referred to as the 
“abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human”.117 This so-
called legal nakedness arose from the fact that the nationality the person 
possessed was unlikely to afford her any protection or otherwise provide her 
with the benefits normally flowing from the possession of a nationality.118 
Holborn characterises this as a lacunae in international law; 
In the nation-state system of modern times, refugees, who by definition are either 
de facto or de jure stateless, and thus people of no-man’s land, are an anomaly. 
Therefore, the general rules of international law had a lacunae which had to be 
filled with special provisions to secure a legal status for refugees.
119
 
In sum, refugees were considered an anomaly in international traditional 
law. Writing in 1954, Paul Weis held that “[t]he status of refugees is precar-
ious in many ways”.120 During the post-World War I period, the precarious 
status of refugees had become painfully evident. As a means to remedy this 
situation the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in 1921 called for the establishment of a supra-national authority 
working to strengthen the ‘legal protection’ and ‘representation’ of refugees 
in Europe.121 The initial steps in erecting an international framework for 
refugee protection – spanning the period between 1921 and 1945 – will be 
covered in the following section. 
                                                 
116 See Oudejans, 2014, 10, with further reference to Panhuys, 1959, 44. 
117 Arendt, 1958, 297. 
118 Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992b, 891. 
119 Holborn, 1975, 154. 
120 Weis, 1954, 193. 




3.3 Legal and political protection, the same as international protection? 
3.3.1 Refugee protection under the League of Nations (1921-1945) 
The term ‘international protection’ was not introduced until 1949,122 but the 
1921 appointment of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen as the League of Nation’s (LoN) – 
and history’s –  first High Commissioner for Refugees marks the beginning 
of an international and coordinated effort to provide support to refugees. 
These efforts would eventually culminate in the adoption of the UNHCR 
Statute.123 Authorized to define the legal status of refugees, organize their 
repatriation or allocation to other countries, assisting them in finding work 
in their country of residence and, with the assistance of aid groups, extend-
ing refugees with relief efforts,124 the High Commissioner’s mandate was 
defined in terms of the provision ‘political and legal protection’ to refugees. 
When Dr. Nansen entered into office, no international refugee law 
was in existence,125 but according to Arendt, states generally agreed that an 
“outside body” was needed to provide refugees with a guarantee of their 
elementary rights.126 Throughout his period, Dr. Nansen negotiated several 
legal instruments aimed at remedying the lack of a legal status of refugees127 
and a system based on conventional treaty law began to emerge.128 The 
Nansen Passport System represented one such legal instrument.129 From 
1923, it provided Russian and Armenian refugees with travel documents 
whose importance, argued Holborn, “hardly can be overestimated”.130 Alt-
hough the Nansen Passport System did not hold the status of treaty law, it 
represents the first international identity paper that granted refugees of spe-
cific categories with a legal and juridical status.131 In 1933, the Convention 
Relating to the International Status of Refugees became the first treaty law 
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instrument to address the legal status of refugees.132 The convention only 
applied to a limited group of refugees,133 and merely eight states ratified it, 
but for the first time in history, a written source of international law ex-
pressed the principle of non-refoulement.134 From Article 3, it follows that 
[e]ach of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its territo-
ry by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the 
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorised to reside there regular-




Moreover, the 1933 Refugee Convention ensured refugees “the enjoyment 
of civil rights, free and ready access to courts, security and stability as re-
gards establishment and work, facilities in the exercise of the professions, of 
industry and commerce, and in regard to the movement of persons, admis-
sion to schools and universities”.136 As we shall see below, the convention 
would later serve as a model for the 1951 Refugee Convention.137 
Between 1933 and 1947, a host of temporary and non-universal ref-
ugee protection agencies and high commissioners were established, with an 
ever-increasing number of people and groups falling under their mandate.138 
The normative and institutional protection framework that started to evolve 
under the LoN received criticism for its lack of universality, both due to 
inherent geographic restrictions and low rates of ratification. Notwithstand-
ing these practical limitations, ‘political and legal protection’ under LoN 
had profound implications on what later became UNHCR’s mandate to pro-
vide ‘international protection’. Not least owing to its focus on remedying 
the refugee’s lack of legal status under international law and on securing the 
physical safety of refugees by defining and strengthening the principle of 
non-refoulement. 
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3.3.2 Refugee protection under the International Refugee Organizations 
(1947-1950) 
In its very first session, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution stat-
ing that “the problem of refugees and displaced persons of all categories is 
one of immediate urgency” and that the problem of refugees was “global in 
scope”.139 Established as a temporary response to the post-World War II 
refugee situation, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) started its 
operations in 1947.140 The organization was given a comprehensive man-
date, and would provide for the “repatriation, identification, registration and 
classification; care and assistance; legal and political protection and the re-
settlement and re-establishment of refugees”.141 Its constitution also stated 
that IRO was mandated to conclude agreements with states to receive refu-
gees for the purpose of protecting their “legitimate rights and interests”.142 
This part of IRO’s mandate became defining to the agency’s activities, 
which was known as a “resettlement agency”.143 In opposite to its predeces-
sors, IRO operated individual status determination processes, as to opposite 
to group based ones, but continued the tradition of only recognising persons 
of specific nationalities as potential refugee.144 By the end of June 1950, 
IRO had resettled more than 700,000 refugees, while 174,000 so-called 
‘hard core refugees’ remained in European camps.145 
 
3.4 ‘International protection’ and the creation of UNHCR 
By the end of World War II, a majority of Western states reached general 
agreement on the following four premises of refugee protection; 1) refugees 
had legitimate needs for legal status under international law, which entailed 
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both a recognition of the refugee’s lack of protection from a state of origin 
and of the entitlement to some sort of alternative protection; 2) the respect 
for the principle of non-refoulement; 3) refugees’ basic needs would have to 
be met by the refugee hosting state, and 4) a common and/or coordinated 
protection system needed to be established.146 
Already in 1946, the Commission on Human Rights asked UN to 
consider “the legal status of persons who do not enjoy the protection of any 
government, in particular pending the acquisition of nationality, as regards 
their legal and social protection and their documentation”.147 The UN Gen-
eral Secretary followed suit and published the report A Study of Stateless-
ness, which stands as “a key document” in establishing the international 
refugee protection regime.148 The study describes refugees as mostly de jure 
stateless and sometimes de facto stateless, and recommends that this catego-
ry of people should be “granted an international legal status guaranteeing 
them the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, and assured of the protec-
tion of an international organ of an intergovernmental character”.149 This 
long, but nevertheless useful extract from the study sums up the point of 
departure of the drafting of what later became the 1950 UNHCR Statute and 
the 1951 Refugee Convention; 
The conferment of a status is not sufficient in itself to regularize the standing of 
stateless persons and to bring them into the orbit of the law; they must also be 
linked to an independent organ which would to some extent make up for the ab-
sence of national protection and render them certain services which the authorities 
of a country of origin render to their nationals resident abroad. Such an organ is 
undoubtedly needed. The status of stateless persons, however carefully deter-
mined, cannot become a reality unless there is an organ of international protec-
tion. Such an organ would need to work in close collaboration with the Govern-
ments of the reception countries. It should comprise a central office with subsidi-
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As noted in Section 3.3, the term ‘international protection’ replaced ‘legal 
and political protection’ during 1949 and as the above quote shows us, the 
concept was used in the report A Study of Statelessness. In the report, ‘inter-
national protection’ is left undefined, but the quote tells us that the overall 
aim was to bring the refugee “into the orbit of the law”.  Originally, the UN 
initiated a process of drafting a legal instrument collecting both the legal 
and institutional framework of refugee protection. As such, what is now 
known as the 1950 UNHCR Statute and the1951 Refugee Convention were 
envisaged as one treaty and were drafted “almost simultaneously”.151 This 
approach was eventually abandoned, partly due to the growing tension be-
tween the Western and Eastern European States. Holborn argues that the 
processes of drafting the UNHCR Statute and the Refugee Convention was 
separated because the drafting states were willing to give a new internation-
al refugee agency a broad scope of concern, but they were less willing to 
accept new, equally broad legal obligations themselves.152  
Notwithstanding the separation of the UNHCR Statute and the Refu-
gee Convention, there was an intended complementarity between the re-
sponsibilities of the UNHCR as amended in the Statute and the new refugee 
convention,153 and both sprung from the common objective of providing 
protection to refugees through remedying the legal lacunae in which refu-
gees were placed. The implications of these circumstances on the interpreta-
tion of ‘international protection’ at the time of adopting the UNHCR Statute 
will be linked with the analysis of the relevant preparatory work in the fol-
lowing chapter. 
 
3.3.3 Fragmented implementation 
Between 1921 and 1950, approaches to refugee movement were represented 
by ad hoc responses based on the principles that refugees belonged to a spe-
cific group of migrants with a special need of help that – owing to persecu-
tion – could not be returned to their country of origin.154 The evolution of a 
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legal framework strengthened the mandate and scope of the protection 
agency, and vice versa. Neither the conventions adopted nor the agencies 
established were universal in scope, however. Furthermore, even though 
providing ‘legal and political protection’ defined the mandate of each and 
all of the protection agencies in this period, the concept was never defined 
in sources of law.155 Weis claims that in spite of the considerable amount of 
agencies dedicated to the protection of refugees before UNHCR, “their ac-
tivities in the exercise of this function have been remarkably uniform”. Weis 
categorizes the work of promoting legal and political protection in four, 
broad areas of activity; 1) the promotion, conclusion and ratification of in-
ternational refugee law and supervision of its application; 2) consultation of 
governments on administrative and legislative measures to overcome legal 
disabilities of refugees and ensure improvements in their status; 3) conclu-
sion of agreements with governments in order to gain territorial access to set 
up offices for the practical execution of their protection function, particular-
ly as regards direct contact with refugees; and; 4) the representation of indi-
viduals’ interests vis-à-vis central and local authorities.156 
The description of the agencies’ pursuit of ‘legal and political pro-
tection’ offered by Weis in the above quote concurs with the definition of-
fered by IRO’s Executive Secretary. It understands ‘legal and political pro-
tection’ as 
one single form of protection, which is both legal and political in character. It is 
legal in so far as its object is to safeguard the rights and legitimate interests of ref-
ugees, and in particular to provide for, observe and regulate the application of ex-
isting agreements on the legal status of refugees; to provide, if necessary, for their 
revision; to supervise their day-today application in particular cases; to provide, if 
necessary, for the conclusion of new agreements; and to exercise quasi-consular 
functions (…) protection is at the same time of a political nature, in that it implies 
relations with the government.
157  
 
As suggested in Section 3.3.1, the core of ‘legal and political protection’ 
seemed to focus on remedying the refugee’s lack of legal status under inter-
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national law. The term consequently obligates the refugee protection agency 


























Chapter 4: Interpreting ‘international protection’ in 1950 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, the analysis of how ‘international protection’ has evolved over 
time continues. Specifically, it asks how the concept was interpreted at the 
time of adoption of the UNHCR Statute. The following chapter builds on 
the discussions on methodology in Chapter 2, primarily Section 2.1 – 2.3. 
As such, the first step in the following chapter is to analyse the “ordinary 
meaning” to be given to ‘international protection’ “in [its] context” and in 
“the light of its object and purpose”. Furthermore, relevant rules of interna-
tional law will be assessed. Each of these elements are to be analysed on an 
equal footing, though not necessarily be granted the same weight in the final 
stages of the interpretation process. After having followed the rule of inter-
pretation as expressed in VCLT Article 31, a preliminary conclusion will be 
reached. The second step of Chapter 4 is taken by recourse to the preparato-
ry work of the UNHCR Statute, as we recall is considered a legitimate sup-
plementary means of interpretation according to VCLT Article 32. In the 
final part, Section 4.4, I gather, compare and weigh the different findings 
under VCLT Article 31 in light of VCLT Article 32. In this final section, I 
also bring in the circumstances relevant to the interpretation as identified in 
Chapter 3, and finally offer a conclusion. 
 
4.2 ‘International protection’ in light of VCLT Article 31 
4.2.1 Ordinary meaning… 
In accordance with the rules of interpretation presented in Section 2.3.1 of 
Chapter 2, the interpretation of ‘international protection’ start with the ‘or-
dinary meaning of the term. 
To repeat, Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute states that: 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (…) shall assume the func-
tion of providing international protection (…) to refugees who fall within the 
scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of 
refugees.158 
                                                 




‘International’ is something qualitatively different from ‘regional’ or ‘na-
tional’ and thus implies an arrangement or interaction between states or oth-
er subjects of international law. The concept of providing ‘protection’ im-
plies ensuring some sort of safety or security measure, but the term is elu-
sive and read in isolation it could span from everything between legal to 
physical provisions aiming to safeguard someone or something. The cou-
pling of ‘international’ and ‘protection’ does not result in a separate mean-
ing that stands alone,159 but by reading the concept in its context, we might 
get a better understanding of what ‘international protection’ means. 
 
4.2.2  … in its context 
Recall that according to the VCLT Article 31.2, ‘context’ for the purpose of 
interpretation shall be understood as “the text, including its preamble and 
annexes”. In so far as the UNHCR is itself an annex, with no preamble, 
these sources of context are not available in determining the ordinary mean-
ing of ‘international protection’. The UNGA resolution to which the 
UNHCR Statute is attached – UNGA Resolution 428 (V) – simply calls 
upon Governments to co-operate with UNHCR and does not elaborate fur-
ther on what the UNHCR’s protection function entails.160 Thus, ‘context’ in 
the case of the UNHCR Statute is limited to the Statute as a whole. In the 
following, I focus on Article 1, 6 and 8. In my view, these articles provide 
most to the understanding of ‘international protection’.  
We have already established that Article 1 addresses the mandate of 
UNHCR, and that the mandate consists both in providing ‘international pro-
tection’ and finding ‘permanent solutions’ to refugees. Article 1 is located in 
Chapter I: General Provisions. Article 6 defines who is a refugee while 
Article 8 lists nine activities that the UNHCR is expected to engage in. Both 
articles are located in Chapter II: Functions of the High Commissioner.161 
The question to be addressed in the following section is what the ordinary 
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meaning of ‘international protection’ is in light of Article 1, 6 and 8 in the 
UNHCR Statute. I begin with Article 6. 
 As presented above, Article 6 defines who is entitled to refugee sta-
tus under the auspices of the UNHCR. Without going into detail on what the 
eligibility criterions are (see Section 1.2.1 for the definition), for the purpose 
of interpreting ‘international protection’ it is sufficient to point to the fact 
that being recognised as a refugee is the entrance point for being granted 
‘international protection’. This is made clear by the fact that UNHCR’s 
mandate is demarcated to provide ‘international protection’ to “refugees” 
only and that “refugees” are stated as the beneficiaries of every activity 
listed in Article 8 (to be discussed below). Stated differently: recognition as 
a refugee is a prerequisite for being entitled to ‘international protection’ 
under the UNHCR. In my understanding, this is a strong indicator that ‘in-
ternational protection’ begins with recognising the need for a special status 
for people beyond the sphere of state protection. This implies that the mere 
recognition as a refugee is in itself a part of ‘international protection’. The 
question is of course, whether ‘international protection’ means more than 
simply receiving a special legal status under international law. Article 8 
brings us closer to an answer. 
According to Article 8, UNHCR shall provide for the ‘international pro-
tection’ of refugees falling under its competence by: 
(a) Promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for 
the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing 
amendments thereto; 
(b) Promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution of 
any measure calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce 
the number requiring protection; 
(c) Assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatria-
tion or assimilation within new national communities; 
(d) Promoting the admission of refugees, not excluding those in the most desti-
tute categories, to the territories of States; 
(e) Endeavouring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets and 




(f) Obtaining from Governments information concerning the number and con-
ditions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concern-
ing them; 
(g) Keeping in close touch with the Governments and inter-governmental or-
ganizations concerned; 
(h) Establishing contact in such manner as he may think is best with private 
organizations dealing with refugee questions; 
(i) Facilitating the co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations con-
cerned with the welfare of refugees. 
The list is comprehensive, and raises the question of whether Article 8 in 
fact offers a definition of ‘international protection’. In my view, the answer 
is no. Article 8 defines a range of activities that the UNHCR must carry out 
in order to meet its obligations, but provides no answer as to what the 
UNHCR is actually set to achieve by performing these activities. To “pro-
vide international protection to refugees” must surely entail that the refugees 
are receiving something that could be considered ‘international protection’. 
Article 8 does not tell us what that something is. This could be framed as the 
difference between establishing a framework to facilitate ‘international pro-
tection’ and articulating the actual nature of the mandate.162 Nevertheless, 
the common characteristics of the range of activities listed in Article 8 
might bring us closer to what ‘international protection’ meant in 1950. 
I suggest categorising Article 8 into four groups of activities, though 
some of the sub-articles fit into more than one category. The first group 
aims at promoting the physical safety of refugees (para. c and d), the second 
group aims at strengthening the legal status of refugees (para. a, b, e, f); the 
third group of activities aim at obtaining durable solutions for refugees (pa-
ra. c); while the fourth and last group gives UNHCR the function of coordi-
nating efforts made by States, governmental and non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) (para. g, h, i).163 Based on these four groups, ‘international 
protection’ could be said to encompass both legal and physical measures 
which have the potential of contributing to ending the refugee’s need for a 
special status under international law. These measures should be imple-
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mented through state and NGO action, while UNHCR is given a mandate to 
promote, facilitate, strengthen and supervise these measures. In sum, the list 
suggests an international refugee agency focused on obstacles on a legal and 
structural level, that seeks solutions on an international level, and leaves the 
national implementation of these measures to states and NGOs. This under-
standing of UNHCR as working on a structural level, as compared to for 
instance assisting individual refugees, finds support in Article 2, which 
states that the work of UNHCR “shall relate, as a rule, to groups and catego-
ries of refugees”. The focus on groups and categories suggest that the activi-
ties under UNHCR’s mandate is limited to convincing states to strengthen 
the treatment of refugees through new international or national legislation. 
This conclusion could to some degree be modified by Article 8 b, 
which permits the UNHCR to make special agreements with states to pro-
mote “any measure” calculated to improve the “situation of refugees”. The 
term “any measure” suggests that there are no limits as to what kind of ac-
tivities the UNHCR can engage in, provided they are conducted in order to 
strengthen the situation of refugees.  
If we accept the notion that ‘international protection’ entails any-
thing that has the potential of remedying the situation of refugees and the 
potential of reducing the number of refugees, then mapping UNHCR’s in-
ternational legal responsibility becomes extremely difficult. However, read 
in connection to the refugee definition in Article 6, the term “situation of 
refugees” refers to the fact that refugees lack national protection. Thus, in 
my view, when Article 8 b refers to “improving the situation of refugees”, it 
gives UNHCR competency to improve the protection framework within a 
specific state as a means to eventually remove the need for a special status. 
This harmonizes well with its function of promoting the conclusion and rati-
fication of international conventions, as stated in Article 8 a and seems to 
establish coherence among the activities listed in Article 8. Furthermore, it 
seems to be in line with the second part of UNHCR’s mandate, which ac-
cording to Article 1 is ‘seeking permanent solutions’ to refugees. 
Judging from the wording of Article 1, ‘providing international pro-
tection’ and ‘seeking permanent solutions’ are to be understood as two sepa-




this thesis to analyse what ‘permanent solutions’ mean in practice, reading 
‘international protection’ in light of the former could give us useful insight 
in the nature of the latter. Thus, and if considered as a whole, Article 1 sug-
gests that ‘international protection’ is a first step towards ‘permanent solu-
tions’. As such, one could argue that ‘international protection’ would be 
limited only to measures that promote solutions. On the other hand, if that 
were the case, ‘international protection’ holds no independent meaning. 
From a legislative point of view, that conclusion seems unsatisfactory as it 
would make little sense to include both concepts in the text. While it is un-
certain how ‘seeking permanent solutions’ to refugees influences the inter-
pretation of ‘international protection’, it is beyond doubt that ‘permanent 
solutions’ depend on the provision state protection. If seen as two aspects of 
reaching the same goal, ‘international protection’ must be understood as a 
temporary measure. 
In light of Article 1, 6 and 8 of the UNHCR Statute, the ordinary 
meaning of ‘international protection’, as a minimum, entails being recog-
nised as a person bereft of state protection. Refugee status under the 
UNHCR springs from this recognition. Furthermore, ‘international protec-
tion’ entails standing under the auspices of an international organ that repre-
sents the refugee on the international plane. Lastly, ‘international protection’ 
is a temporary measure in pursuit of a permanent solution. In other words, 
international protection is rendered redundant as soon as permanent solu-
tions are found. What this tells us is that ‘international protection’ can never 
fully compensate for protection under a state. 
 
4.2.3  … in light of objective and purpose 
In so far as the lack of state protection is the defining characteristic of all 
refugees, remedying this situation must presumably be the primary objective 
of ‘international protection’. Framed differently, “the need for international 
protection is premised on the failure of national protection”.164 By establish-
ing a High Commissioner for a specific group of people, the UN recognises 
that there is a need for international representation not provided for through 
                                                 




other mechanisms. As such, the overall purpose of establishing UNHCR 
seem to be to provide refugees with representation on the international 
plane. The objective and purpose of the UNHCR Statute seems to coincide 
well with the preliminary conclusion reached above, however, because de-
fining ‘international protection’ is so closely interconnected with defining 
the organisation’s objective and purpose, this source of interpretation adds 
little to the overall analysis. What it does tell us, is that the reflections based 
on the ordinary meaning of the word and on the context are well founded 
and seemingly in line with the intentions of the drafters. Before we go on to 
discuss the drafting process, we look to relevant rules of international law to 
see whether they can contribute to the understanding of what ‘international 
protection’ meant in 1950. 
 
4.2.4  Relevant rules of international law 
In Chapter 2, we saw that rules of international law should be taken into 
account when interpreting the ordinary meaning of ‘international protection’ 
if these are considered “relevant”. While the term relevant is broad, in the 
case of the UNHCR Statute, Article 1 narrows its scope by stating that 
UNHCR provides ‘international protection’ “under the auspices” of the UN. 
In Section 2.2, I mentioned that the UN Charter is the constituent instrument 
of the UN. Arguable, the fact that UNHCR is executing its mandate “under 
the auspices” of the UN must entail that UNHCR is bound to operate in 
compliance with the principles expressed in the UN Charter. Moreover, and 
due to the UNHCR’s status as a subsidiary organ of the UN, established 
because it was “deemed necessary for the performance of [UN’s] func-
tions”,165 the agency must also be held responsible for the promotion of the 
principles embodied in the UN Charter. 
Of particular relevance to the interpretation of ‘international protec-
tion’ is the overall aim of UN, expressed in Article 1 of the UN Charter as to 
“promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms”.166 Because UNHCR was established as a subsidiary organ of the 
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UN in order to represent refugees in international law, in my view, it is a 
logical extension of responsibilities that the agency is tasked to promote the 
human rights of this group when performing its mandate. At the time of 
adoption the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) had been 
passed by the UNGA. In spite of being a non-binding legal instrument, the 
preamble of UDHR expresses a clear linkage to the UN Charter and thus 
establishes a presumption that these two are two be read in connection to 
each other.167  
According to UDHR Article 14, “everyone has the rights to seek and 
enjoy in other countries the asylum from persecution”.168 Although the 
UNHCR Statute does not mention the right to seek asylum, Article 6 defines 
the “fear of being persecuted” as a cornerstone in the definition of refugees. 
As such, both the provision of ‘international protection’ under UNHCR and 
promoting the rights to seek and enjoy asylum in UDHR starts with the 
recognition of a person being exposed to persecution. Thus, in my view, the 
two legal instruments are established to safeguard the same group of people. 
Indeed, though not formulated as clearly as in UDHR Article 14, Article 8 d 
of the UNHCR Statute states that the agency shall promote “the admission 
of refugees (…) to the territories of States” in order to promote ‘internation-
al protection’. In conclusion, recourse to the UN Charter Article 1 and 
UDHR Article 14 indicates that ‘international protection’ must be under-
stood as both the recognition of refugee status and access to territory where 
they will no longer be subject to persecution. 
It should not go unnoticed however, that relevant rules of interna-
tional law at the time of the UNHCR statute’s adoption also encompassed 
the 1933 Refugee Convention. Although the convention was limited in 
scope (see Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3), it nevertheless contained a list of 
civil rights that refugees were entitled to. Most importantly, Article 3 of the 
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1933 Convention expressed the principle of non-refoulement. In 1950, the 
1933 Refugee Convention was still the only convention pertaining to the 
rights of refugees, and as such, according to Article 8 of the UNHCR Stat-
ute, a part of UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ mandate entailed “pro-
moting the conclusion and ratification” of the 1933 Refugee Convention and 
“supervising” its application. As such, and despite the fact that the Statute 
does not explicitly mention “rights” in its wording, there are legal ties be-
tween an instrument of international law that expresses civil rights accorded 
to refugees and UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international protection’. 
Because the UNHCR Statute applies to all nationalities, the geographical 
limitations of the 1933 Refugee Convention do not apply. In my view, this 
must entail that ‘international protection’ under UNHCR, as a minimum, 
must be understood as the promotion of refugee rights as expressed in the 
1933 Refugee Convention. By linking the principle of non-refoulement in 
the 1933 Refugee Convention with both Article 8 d of the UNHCR Statute 
and Article 14 of UDHR, I find it clear that ‘international protection’ at the 
time of adopting the Statute, obligated the UNHCR to promote some form 
of territorial protection to refugees. 
 
4.2.5 VCLT 31: preliminary findings 
After having analysed ‘international protection’ by recourse to its ordinary 
meaning (4.2.1) in light of its context (4.2.2), object and purpose (4.2.3), 
and eventually by looking at relevant rules of international law (4.2.4), I 
suggest separating UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international protection’ 
to refugees into two levels. The first level encompasses the overarching re-
sponsibility placed on UNHCR to represent refugees on the international 
plane. The UNHCR’s aim of promoting both an international and national 
legal framework that recognizes refugees as subjects of law, is a defining 
characteristic of ‘international protection’. As such, the overarching objec-
tive and purpose of ‘international protection’ seems to be representation on 
a structural level. 
The second level consists of two fundamental cornerstones and helps 




tion under international law through refugee status, and 2) physical safety 
from persecution through access to the territories of states. 
 The first cornerstone – refugee status – is derived by reading the 
UNHCR Statue Article 1 in light of Article 6 and 8. Whether providing ‘in-
ternational protection’ entailed that the UNHCR would perform the deter-
mination process is not answered, but judging from the activities listed in 
Article 8, my answer would be no. This does not imply that the UNHCR did 
not have room in its mandate to pursue such measures, however. As we re-
member from the discussions in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2, the doctrine of 
implied powers might give UNHCR leeway to interpret ‘international pro-
tection’ to encompass more than what is explicitly expressed in the Statute. 
The second cornerstone – access to territories of states – is derived 
by reading Article 8 d in compliance with UDHR Article 14 on the right to 
seek and enjoy asylum and Article 3 of 1933 Refugee Convention that codi-
fies the principle of non-refoulement. Because UNHCR does not possess 
territory, their role is limited to promoting the admission of refugees. 
In sum, the above conclusion is both partly clear and partly “ambig-
uous and obscure”. Recalling that VCLT Article 32 permits recourse to pre-
paratory work, either to “confirm the meaning resulting from the application 
of Article 31”, or to “determine the meaning of the interpretation according 
Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous In order to “confirm” what is clear 
and “determine” what is not, Section 4.3.1 looks at the preparatory work of 
the UNHCR Statute. 
 
 
4.3 VCLT Article 32: Preparatory work as supplementary interpretation 
In Chapter 3, we learned that the concept ‘legal and political protection’ was 
used to define the responsibilities of UNHCR’s predecessors and that ‘inter-
national protection’ was introduced as a concept in 1949. We now pick up 
on the origins of ‘international protection’ as outlined in Chapter 3 and go 
further into depth on the discussion related to adopting the concept in the 




As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, preparatory work refers to a category 
that spans a wide range of potential sources. As a general rule, preparatory 
works should be judged by their authenticity, completeness and availabil-
ity.169 Within the scope of this thesis, it is simply impossible to cover the 
breadth of all documents that could be taken to fall within the category pre-
paratory work related to the UNHCR Statute. There is a lot. As such, I have 
not aimed at offering a complete presentation of this supplementary source 
but chosen to emphasize the parts which – in my view – give a representa-
tive picture of the views expressed during the drafting of the Statute. When 
analysing the preparatory works, I have encountered a so-called availability 
issue, meaning that some sources of interest have proven very difficult to 
locate. As such, some parts of the preparatory work could have proven cen-
tral may not have been identified. Furthermore, others might have chosen 
differently. Consequently, the weight accorded to the preparatory work in 
this thesis will not be sufficient to dismiss any of the above preliminary 
conclusions. However, according to VCLT Article 32 they could be used to 
confirm or at least strengthen an interpretation, or hopefully, supplement the 
conclusion. In the following text, I highlight some of the findings which in 
my view are relevant as a supplement to what is already covered. 
The term ‘international protection’ was first introduced by the 
French delegate during the introductory deliberations in ECOSOC.170 The 
term won ground, and in Resolution 248 (IX) A, ECOSOC called for the 
UNGA to “decide the functions and organizational arrangements within the 
framework of the United Nations necessary for the international protection 
of refugees after the IRO terminates its activities”.171 The resolution resulted 
in the extensive Report on Refugees and Stateless Persons which deliberat-
ed on the concepts of both ‘legal protection’ and ‘international protection’. 
In the introduction, the report states that it is to deal mainly with the future 
of "international protection and related functions" and with "the nature and 
extent of legal protection functions" following the dismantling of IRO.172 
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The document seems to either equate ‘international’ with ‘legal’ protection, 
or at least recognise that the terms hold overlapping aspects. Notably, the 
second chapter of the report is titled “The nature and extent of international 
protection functions” and then lists ‘international legal protection’ as the 
function of the new refugee protection agency. It goes on to deliberate three 
main disabilities usually encountered by the refugee, which are; (a) condi-
tions of residence, (b) international travel and (c) legal status in the country 
of residence, and concludes that “[l]egal protection would consist in efforts 
to remove these and similar disabilities of refugees who do not enjoy the 
protection of their Governments of nationality or former habitual resi-
dence”.173  
Based on this conclusion, the Report on Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons suggested specific activities that the new agency would be mandated to 
exercise. As such, it in many ways defined the point of departure for the 
lengthy deliberations that later took place within ECOSOC, the Third 
Committee and the Planetary Sessions of UNGA that took place during the 
last six months of 1949. As such, it is a preparatory work of great im-
portance. In my reading, it supports the conclusion that the granting of a 
legal status under international law lies at the core of ‘international protec-
tion’, which represents a continuation of what had been the primary concern 
of High Commissioners ever since Dr. Nansen. The question then arises as 
to why there was a need to introduce a new concept. 
When UNGA chose to replace a more or less well-established con-
cept of international law, the presumption must necessarily be that the aim is 
to gain some form of substantive change of legal implications. As was illus-
trated in Chapter 3, the different refugee protection agencies implemented 
its mandates to provide ‘legal and political protection’ in a range of different 
ways. To my understanding, this implies that the concept was, to a reasona-
ble degree, flexible. What then, was it that UNGA wanted to achieve by 
changing the concept? 
The French delegate who introduced the need for the new concept 
argued that it had become necessary to highlight the difference between 
                                                 




protection as extended by UNHCR, and protection as extended by states. By 
using the term ‘international it would be made clear that UNHCR would 
only have the function “of a higher direction, liaison and control service”174 
that would provide “guidance, supervision, co-ordination and control” with 
the protection offered by states.175 
Under the IRO, protection activities had been underprioritized rela-
tive to the provision of material assistance. The Report on Refugees and 
Stateless Persons concludes that “legal and political protection has on the 
whole been a secondary task, which has been performed largely within the 
framework of material assistance”.176 This situation, it seems, was some-
thing the delegates sought to avoid under the new agency. “Unlike IRO”, 
the UK delegate argued, “the High Commissioner with his small staff would 
not constitute an operational agency; furthermore, he would concern himself 
with refugee problems of a broader and more universal nature than those 
faced by the IRO”.177 This view received support from the US whose repre-
sentative – in spite of maintaining that the ultimate solution to the refugee 
problems was found in economic development – argued that this would be 
provided for through the Marshall Plan, not UNHCR-led programs.178 As a 
compromise between the US delegate, who wanted no funding for material 
assistance what so ever, and the French delegate, who held the view that 
legal protection in many cases was meaningless without material assistance, 
it is clear from Article 10 of the Statute that UNHCR was granted access to 
distribute funds to both private and public agencies in order to provide for 
assistance to refugees, though not carry out direct assistance work on its 
own. The fact that UNGA Resolution 319 A (IV), the last UNHCR related 
resolution passed before the adoption of the UNHCR Statute, proclaims that 
UNHCR was only to consist of “a small staff of persons devoted to the pur-
pose of the Office”179 supports this as activities of a more physical or mate-
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rial character would prove challenging under such conditions.180 It should be 
noted in this regard, that the UNHCR Statute is silent both on the question 
of UNHCR presence in field, which had been an important part of IRO’s 
activities, and on the concept of material assistance.  
On the basis of available preparatory works, I find it safe to conclude 
that refugees’ legal status under international law is at the core of what ‘in-
ternational protection’ meant in 1950. Consensus seems to have been 
reached on limiting the scope of activities under UNHCR, and on granting 




In order to capture how the meaning of ‘international protection’ in the 
UNHCR Statute has evolved over time, there is a need to understand the 
origins of the concept and establish how it was interpreted when the Statute 
was adopted in 1950. This has been the aim of Chapter 3 and 4. Within the 
frames of VCLT Article 31 and 32, my overall conclusion is that UNHCR’s 
mandate to provide ‘international protection’ to refugees should be under-
stood in two levels; 
1) ‘International protection’ is the overarching responsibility placed on 
UNHCR to represent refugees on the international plane. The 
UNHCR’s aim of promoting both an international and national legal 
framework that recognizes refugees as subjects of law, is a defining 
characteristic of ‘international protection’. 
2) The overarching responsibility to represent refugees on the interna-
tional plane can be separated into two fundamental cornerstones;  
a) recognition under international law through refugee status 
b) physical safety from persecution through access to the territories 
of states. 
 
                                                 





In sum, ‘international protection’ shares key features with ‘legal and politi-
cal protection’ under UNHCR’s predecessors. The mandate to provide ‘in-
ternational protection’ was to be carried out by UNHCR through supervis-
ing and supplementing the protection activities undertaken by States on their 
respective territory. ‘International protection’ in the UNHCR Statute was 
understood to provide UNHCR primarily with a liaison function. Important-
ly, UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ mandate covered ‘refugees’, as de-
fined in the Statute Article 6. It should be noted however, that in the section 
on the preparatory work, a tension between legal protection and material 
assistance was identified. In my view, a clear consensus was never reached 
as to whether material assistance should be regarded as a part of providing 
‘international protection’. As we shall see in the chapters below, this got 
















Chapter 5: 1950-1980: Expanding the scope of ‘international 
protection’ 
The field of UNHCR competence, and thus the field of its responsibilities, has 
broadened considerably since the Office was first established. Briefly, the move-




In the following two chapters, we continue to analyse how the meaning of 
‘international protection’ in the UNHCR Statute has evolved over time. The 
above quote refers to what Goodwin-Gill and McAdam seem to identify as 
three stages in the evolution of interpreting UNHCR’s mandate. The first 
stage is represented through the establishment of the agency with the adop-
tion of the UNHCR Statute. The second stage, referred to as ‘good offices’ 
and assistance can be placed within the 1950-1980 time frame, while the 
third and so far the last stage, ‘protection’ and ‘solutions’, started during the 
1980s as is arguably still in play.  
In Chapter 3 and 4, we answered how ‘international protection’ was 
understood at the time of adoption of the UNHCR Statute. In doing so, we 
established what UNHCR’s responsibilities entailed during the first stage of 
the evolution process. Stated briefly: in 1950, ‘international protection’ 
meant providing a status to refugees and promoting their physical safety. 
UNHCR would meet its responsibilities by acting as an international liaison 
focused on the representation of refugees on the international plane and 
promoting legal mechanisms on their behalf. 
The aim of Chapter 5 and 6 is to analyse the second and third stage 
of the evolution of UNHCR’s responsibilities. Both chapters will be struc-
tured in a semi-linear way. By this I mean that I will follow the historic de-
velopment, however organized around concepts related to what Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam suggest as overarching themes of these decades. In Chap-
                                                 




ter 5, I focus on ‘international protection’ in light of the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention (Section 5.3); material assistance (Section 5.4), ‘good office’ (Sec-
tion 5.5) and ‘humanitarian task’ (Section 5.6). In Chapter 6, I focus on ‘so-
lutions’, ‘human rights’ and ‘protection crisis’ (more on this in Section 6.1). 
In the remainder of this chapter, I first give a short introduction to 
the political and institutional context ‘international protection’ started to 
evolve in. In Section 5.3, I argue that already in 1951, the interpretation of 
‘international protection’ started to change significantly, as the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention provided what has later been framed as ‘baseline rights’ in 
refugee protection. Section 5.4-5.5 analyse UNHCR practice and interpreta-
tion in addition to UNGA Resolutions and argues that the meaning of ‘in-
ternational protection’ expanded significantly between 1950 and 1980. The 
account will focus on what I identify as the refugee situations that played 
the most central role in the evolution of ‘international protection’, notably in 
Hungary, China, Algeria and Pakistan-Bangladesh. I will not, however, go 
into detail in regards to the realities on the ground. 
 
5.2 Contextualization 
5.2.1 Cold War and institutional conditions 
UNHCR was established at a point in history where Cold War politics dom-
inated, and UNHCR was quickly caught in the middle of it. Refugees were 
seen as an element of power in the East-West rivalry.182 In 1950, approxi-
mately one million people fell within UNHCR’s mandate, while its initial 
budget amounted to $ 30,000.183 Furthermore, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
was yet to be adopted, thus, the legal protection framework in existence on-
ly applied to specific groups of nationalities.184 Indeed, the UNHCR’s insti-
tutional and financial conditions were meagre and the agency’s opportuni-
ties to promote the interests of refugees were rather limited.185 UNHCR’s 
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early work mainly focused on ensuring entry and ease integration of refu-
gees in Europe.186 And even though the early days of UNHCR have been 
characterized as “modest and uncertain”,187 the agency was nonetheless able 
to navigate within and capitalize on world events that uprooted millions of 
people both in Europe and elsewhere during the first decade of the organisa-
tion’s existence.188 While not going further into depth on questions of real-
politik, it is necessary to understand the context in which the interpretation 
of ‘international protection’ took place in order to understand how UNHCR 
could “transformation from a small legal protection agency to the world’s 
largest humanitarian relief agency”.189  
 
5.2.2 Extending the legal refugee protection framework 
The adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention is of fundamental importance 
to the evolution of ‘international protection’ in the UNHCR Statue. Along 
with its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugee Problems 
in Africa190, it arguably brought “a profound change for the better in the 
body of international law”.191 As pointed by Goodwin-Gill, policies of pro-
tection must be derived from “principles explicit or implicit in the existing 
law, as developed and interpreted in practice, and from the principles of 
fundamental human rights acknowledged by the international communi-
ty”.192 To UNHCR, the expansion of the refugee protection framework that 
started with the 1951 Refugee Convention, and which later expanded on an 
international, regional and national level, widened UNHCR’s authority 
when adopting protection policy under its ‘international protection’ man-
date. As we recall from Chapter 4, the UNHCR Statute does not elaborate in 
detail on what ‘international protection’ means in terms of refugee entitle-
ments. Thus, the new conventions gave UNHCR room to adopt policy based 
on entitlements accorded to refugees in binding legal instruments of interna-
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tional law and thus provided what UNHCR itself called a “firm foundation 
of for the work of international protection”.193 
The next section focuses on how refugee entitlement expressed in 
the 1951 Refugee Convention affected the meaning of ‘international protec-
tion’194 and later manifested itself in ExCom Conclusions on International 
Protection. 
 
5.3 ‘International protection’ as legal entitlement 
5.3.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention as a source of interpretation 
In Chapter 4, I argued that UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international pro-
tection’ had to be interpreted in light of the 1933 Refugee Convention. At 
the time of the UNHCR Statute’s adoption, it was a “relevant rule of inter-
national law applicable in the relations between the parties”.195 From Chap-
ter 2, on the ordinary rules of interpretation, we recall that ICJ have stated 
that an “international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpreta-
tion”.196 In 1951, when the new Refugee Convention replaced previous in-
ternational refugee protection law, hereunder the 1933 Refugee Conven-
tion,197 the 1951 Refugee Convention became a “relevant rule of interna-
tional law” that would have to be addressed when interpreting the UNHCR 
Statute. Furthermore, due to Article 35 of the Refugee Convention which 
states that contracting states “undertake to co-operate with the Office of the 
UNHCR (…) in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate 
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its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention”, 
a legally binding link between the international organ of refugee protection 
and the international instrument regulating their status had been estab-
lished198 and the mandate to provide ‘international protection’ had thus 
found a conventional base.199 
 The 1951 Refugee Convention codifies what has later been de-
scribed as a “critical group of baseline rights”.200 Without going into too 
much detail, it is important to get an idea of what the refugee became enti-
tled to under the 1951 Convention. Importantly, Article 33 holds that 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. 
The article gives express to the principle of non-refoulement, which we re-
call had first been included in a written source of international law in the 
1933 Convention. The principle is coupled with the prohibition of penalis-
ing a refugee on account of illegal entry or presence.201 Furthermore, a refu-
gee has the right to freedom of religion, the rights to work, the rights to ele-
mentary education, the right to own property, the right to assembly, access 
to court, and some other welfare-based rights. Importantly, and reflecting 
the recommendations made in the Report on Refugees and Stateless Persons 
(Section 4.3), the refugee is also entitled to identification and travel docu-
ments, in addition to freedom of movement.202 
It is important to note that the 1951 Refugee Convention regulates 
‘state protection’. This means that the adoption of the convention did not 
make UNHCR responsible for the actual fulfilment of the above listed enti-
tlements. However, because UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international 
protection’ includes “[p]romoting the conclusion and ratification of interna-
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tional conventions for the protection of refugees”,203 the agency is responsi-
ble for promoting the entitlements expressed in the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion. As was explained in Chapter 3, the two legal instruments were origi-
nally drafted in one common process, but were eventually separated. At the 
time, states were willing to give a new refugee protection agency a broad 
scope of concern, but less willing to undertake equally broad legal obliga-
tions on themselves. Based on that, one can deduce that UNHCR was never 
meant to have a narrower set of obligations than that of states.204 Conse-
quently, the list of rights in the convention are understood as a minimum 
content of ‘international protection’.205 This conclusion seems to comply 
with the intentions expressed by the parties to the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion. At a late stage in the drafting process, the Belgian delegation noted that 
it was highly desirable to have the UNHCR collaborate with the contracting 
states in the execution of the treaty. It was argued that Article 35 established 
a relationship between the UNHCR and states that would severe as a guar-
antee for refugees. The Belgian delegation emphasised that; 
Although the need for such a guarantee might not often be felt, it was none the less 
true, as the Belgian delegation had already pointed out, that the authorities of the 
country of reception would be at the same time both judge and party in every ap-
peal submitted by a refugee and in every request concerning the exercise of a right 
by a refugee. Article [35] gave refugees moral satisfaction in that it amounted to 
the setting up of the "refugees government" to which they had long aspired.
206
 
Being a preparatory work of the 1951 Refugee Convention, this specific 
quote holds relatively little weight in the interpretation of the UNHCR Stat-
ue. Nevertheless, it gives express to a principle that eventually became trea-
ty law through Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As such, it is 
safe to conclude that by the passing of this convention, the meaning of ‘in-
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ternational protection’ evolved towards a more comprehensive understand-
ing of what the concept entailed.207 
5.3.2 ExCom Conclusions on cornerstones of ‘international protection’ 
By jumping almost 30 years ahead, I wish to highlight how some of the 
principles codified in the 1951 Refugee Convention were later endorsed as 
cornerstones in providing ‘international protection’. We recall from the 
analysis in Section 2.4.3 that the conclusions adopted by ExCom are highly 
relevant when analysing the evolution of ‘international protection’ in 
UNHCR’s mandate. In 1977, ExCom publishes its first Conclusions on In-
ternational Protection. Ratification of the 1951 Convention and to the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,208 access to asylum,209 the fun-
damental humanitarian principle of non-refoulement,210 protection against 
expulsion,211 determination of refugee status,212 and the principle of family 
reunification213 are highlighted as cornerstones of ‘international protection’. 
This accords well with the conclusions reached in Chapter 4 and give ex-
press to principles that prevailed in UNHCR annual reports between 1950 
and late 1970s. What is noteworthy, however, is the fact that the 1977 Ex-
Com conclusions bear no mentioning of material assistance or operations in 
the field, which – as we shall see below – would become central in the pro-
tection activities of UNHCR in the same period. The listed conclusions fails 
to include material assistance, which as we shall see below, had been at the 
forefront of UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ efforts up until 1977. This 
perceived discrepancy between the formal and the operational interpretation 
of ‘international protection’ is noteworthy. 
 In an account of the evolution of the term ‘refugee’, Barnett and 
Finnemore separate between the legal and the operational definitons of the 
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concept.214 This might also help us to understand how the meaning of 
‘international protection’ evolved to encompass both legal entitlement on 
behalf of refugees and the provision of material assistance in the field. With 
the operationality of UNHCR evolving, there seems to have become a 
greater gap between the operational and the legal understanding of 
‘international protection’, meaning that the formal or legal interpretation of 
UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ mandate might very well coincide with 
the 1950 understanding of the term, while the operational aspects of the 
term is more fluid. At the time of drafting the UNHCR Statute, the potential 
operational aspects of ‘international protection’ were never really explored 
and developed due to the non-operational consensus at the time. Because 
movements of people outside their country of origin had become larger and 
more complex than in the past,215 the concept of providing ‘international 
protection’ had to be interpreted in a manner that would make sense not 
only legally, but operationally.  
The next section looks at how material assistance became a part of 
‘international protection’ through UNHCR’s own practice of interpretation 
and subsequent endorsement by UNGA. 
 
5.4 ‘International protection’ towards material assistance 
5.4.1 UNHCR’s interpretations 
In January 1952, UNHCR delivered its annual report to UNGA. The report 
called for both emergency aid and long-term economic assistance to support 
the livelihoods of refugees. With reference to Article 8 b of the Statute, 
UNHCR argued that the mandate to provide ‘international protection’ had to 
be seen in light of seeking ‘permanent solutions’, allowing for “any meas-
ure” to be used.216 UNHCR questioned the adequacy of ‘international pro-
tection’ to meet the needs of refugees and tried to utilise the ambiguous 
wording of the Statute. As was discussed in Chapter 4, Article 8 b can be 
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held to leave room for interpretation outside of the four categories of activi-
ties that I suggested. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Holborn; the predomi-
nant role of UNHCR was seen as being to stimulate and encourage action by 
governments to achieve more favourable treatment of refugees rather than to 
perform direct services for individual refugees or groups of refugees.217 It 
might be recalled from Section 4.4 on the preparatory work, that it was 
agreed that UNHCR would not turn into a new IRO. As such, the appeal for 
long-term economic assistance did not gain immediate recognition by 
UNGA. With is limited budgets, UNHCR was fully dependent on UNGA’s 
approval for raising funds for assistance if the agency would be able to act 
on its wish to widen the scope of ‘international protection’ activities. 
From UNHCR’s point of view, both the phraseology of Article 8 and 
the drafting process confirmed that ‘international protection’ encompassed 
measures of material assistance. According to UNHCR, the various func-
tions outlined in Article 8 highlight the intended change from the mandate 
to provide ‘legal and political protection’, to providing ‘international protec-
tion’.218 It was argued that while it was clearly not the intention of UNGA to 
create another operational organization like IRO, it was equally clear that 
the majority of governments did not wish to restrict UNHCR to the purely 
legal aspects of protection. UNHCR argued that when the drafters deliberat-
ed on the question of material assistance, a clear consensus was never really 
reached. As was concluded in Chapter 4, whether providing material assis-
tance was to be seen as a part of ‘international protection’, in addition to 
providing ‘legal protection’, the drafters only agreed to limit UNHCR’s 
ability to handle funds for assistance, though it was not completely ruled 
out.219 Holborn observes that “the consistent interpretation of the UNHCR 
has been that par. 8 is not meant to be exhaustive”.220 She goes on to argue 
that from the very beginning, UNHCR established a practice of ignoring 
“the obscurities of par. 8 and to rely instead on the broad phrasing of the 
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paragraph and the general tenor of the Statute to support its contention that 
international protection should be interpreted broadly”.221 
The fact that the UNHCR’s “consistent interpretation” has not met 
with protests from UNGA, implies that it could eventually become a legiti-
mate source of interpretation when used to confirm a specific interpretation. 
As explained in Chapter 2, by establishing UNHCR, an autonomous legal 
personality within international law came to existence. It was argued that 
one could see UNHCR to hold a ‘distinct will’ that empowered it to produce 
secondary sources of law. Whether agreeing to this analysis or not, what is 
certain is that UNHCR proved central in driving evolution in the meaning of 
‘international protection’ during its first years of functioning. Although the 
views expressed in the annual UNHCR reports did not receive direct ap-
proval of UNGA, it is possible to argue that the annual reports later became 
central sources of interpreting ‘international protection’. It might be recalled 
that VCLT Article 32 allows recourse to a wide range of sources when look-
ing to confirm the interpretation of a legal instrument. The term acquies-
cence was used to describe the situation when UNHCR develops a specific 
practice of interpretation which UNGA indirectly gives status as authorita-
tive by means of tacit approval. Consequently, UNHCR’s interpretation of 
Article 8 of the Statute proved central to broaden the scope of the meaning 
of ‘international protection’. 
 
5.4.2 UNGA Resolutions 
In February 1952, UNGA passed Resolution 538 (VI) B and authorized 
UNHCR to call for funding “for the purpose of enabling emergency aid” to 
the most “needy refugees”.222 The wording of the resolution clearly demar-
cates against other forms of assistance, and effectively rejected the appeal 
for long-term funding to livelihood assistance. Furthermore, it had a clear 
reference to UNHCR Statute Article 10, which only mandates UNHCR to 
“administer” and “distribute” funds received. 
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Zieck observes that the granting of emergency assistance in accord-
ance with UNHCR Statute Article 10, marked the beginning of UNHCR’s 
expanding budget for the material assistance to refugees.223 Although the 
above quoted resolution only approved calls for emergency aid, UNHCR 
later actually used the resolution to argue that its mandate to provide ‘inter-
national protection’ to refugee had to be broader than that of his organiza-
tion’s predecessors, due to the fact that UNGA had authorised it to issue 
appeals for emergency funds.224 What is more, by 1953 UNHCR argued that 
‘international protection’ encompassed both the traditional legal and politi-
cal protection work and providing economic assistance in the field, as this 
had been “an integral part of the general work of providing international 
protection” during the early 1950’s.225 As such, UNHCR refers to its own 
interpretation and practice as relevant sources to argue for an expansion 
from providing legal protection to a broader scope of assistance activities. 
The same year, 1953, the Ford Foundation granted UNHCR $ 2,9 
million for long-term efforts on behalf of Refugees, which was more in line 
with the funding UNHCR had previously asked UNGA for.226 The money 
received from Ford Foundation was earmarked to be used on housing, agri-
culture, youth projects and vocational training. Within a year, governments 
and private donors supplemented the Ford fund with approximately $ 8 mil-
lion. In compliance with Article 10 of the UNHCR Statute, UNHCR had yet 
to engage directly with service delivery in the field and still used NGOs as 
its “operational arm”. Although limited to identifying and coordinating 
partners for the implementation of the long-term assistance programmes, 
Loescher describes this as a kick-start that had far-reaching consequences 
for how UNHCR’s would subsequently provide ‘international protection’.227 
Although UNGA had only formally approved appeals for emergency funds, 
the fact that governments provided UNHCR with funding to allow for an 
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increased scope of activities could be viewed as a form of approval that con-
firmed UNHCR’s interpretation of the Statute. 
The establishing of UN Refugee Fund (UNREF) in 1955 was argua-
bly the first recognition of UNHCR as a deliverer of long-term material as-
sistance to refugees in Europe.228 The ECOSOC resolution sanctioned pro-
grammes of long-term assistance to refugees that went beyond the scope of 
emergency aid. To my understanding, the establishing of UNREF effective-
ly sanctioned UNHCR’s interpretation of Article 8 b as presented above and 
approved of the approach to ‘international protection’ as measures not only 
focusing on legal aspects of the plight of refugees. 
With the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the consequent uproot-
ing of approximately 200 000 persons, the interpretation of ‘international 
protection’ was further pushed in an assistance approach direction. The Aus-
trian government called on UNHCR to assist the refugees arriving from 
Hungary229 and only after UNHCR had started to respond to the Austrian 
request for help, did UNGA endorse the activities.230 UNHCR argued that 
its mandate encompassed the persons in question and that offering material 
assistance to them fell under the function of providing ‘international protec-
tion’. In an emergency special session, UNGA confirmed UNHCR’s inter-
pretation and passed a resolution calling for UNHCR to make “speedy and 
effective arrangements for emergency assistance to refugees from Hunga-
ry”.231 In subsequent resolutions, UNGA asked UNHCR, “in accordance 
with his responsibility (…) to provide international protection to refugees, 
(…), to develop a comprehensive assessment of the needs, both material and 
financial, of the Hungarian refugees”.232 
It is worth noting that UNGA explicitly asks UNHCR, with refer-
ence to its mandate to provide ‘international protection’, to map the material 
and financial needs of the Hungarian refugees. As was made clear in Chap-
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ter 4, the UNHCR Statute bears no mentioning of UNHCR providing nei-
ther material nor economic assistance to refugees. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the doctrine of implied powers might support the implementation 
of measures not necessarily expressed in an international institution’s con-
stituent instrument, if these are necessary to execute its mandate in an effec-
tive manner. It should also be noted that the UNGA resolution does not ask 
UNHCR to actually deliver the material and economic support the refugee 
might require. Nevertheless, UNGA’s endorsement of UNHCR overseeing 
other aspects than the legal aspects of the refugee reality has been argued to 
start the process of the agency evolution from a “strictly non-operational 
agency with no authority to appeal for funds to an institution with a long-
range program emphasizing not only protection but increasingly material 
assistance”.233  
UNHCR’s response to the Hungarian refugee situation has been 
framed as “the first specific expansion of UNHCR‟s activities”,234 and is 
arguably also the first example of what Goodwin-Gill and McAdam calls 
the “incremental, ‘after the event’, and sometimes accidental growth of 
UNHCR’s area of institutional responsibilities”.235 Loescher argues that 
during this crisis, UNHCR demonstrated a capacity to have independent 
influence on events at the centre of the Cold War politics.236 Due to the po-
litical climate, one should not underestimate the weight UNHCR’s second-
ary law and its practice had on shaping how the meaning of ‘international 
protection’ evolved during the first years of the organisation’s existence. 
Because UNGA followed suit, the legal impact was profound. 
As we will see in the next section, the interpretation of ‘international 
protection’ continued to evolve as a result of an interplay between UNHCR 
and UNGA. 
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5.5 ‘Good offices’ and new groups ‘of concern to the international 
community’ 
5.5.1 UNHCR practice 
Already within UNHCR’s first year of existence, the agency argued that “it 
would be unrealistic to envisage merely a central organ in Geneva from 
which international protection of refugees could be undertaken” and that 
“the requirements of the international protection of refugees (…) would call 
for the establishment of eleven field offices, some of which could cover 
several countries”.237 UNHCR assured that the offices would exclusively 
seek to “assist government in resolving their refugee problem” and that 
“their initiative should be limited to drawing attention to refugee problems 
in the areas with which they were concerned”.238 In the subsequent resolu-
tion, UNGA remained silent on the request. Within one year, UNHCR es-
tablished branch offices in Austria, Belgium, Colombia, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom, the US and Hong Kong 
and held that more would be coming.239  
Zieck identifies the branch offices as key facilitators of the expan-
sion of UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ mandate throughout the 1950s. 
In her view, the field offices made it possible for UNHCR provide legal 
protection to individual refugees, thus “initiating a process that would level 
UNHCR as a non-operational agency and exchange the matching intermedi-
ate mode of implementing Statutory tasks for an immediate one”.240 From 
being a liaison and representing groups and categories of refuges, UNHCR 
started practicing its mandate on an individual basis. Although lacking for-
mal approval by UNGA, the doctrine of implied powers is useful to under-
stand how UNHCR was able to expand its geographical presence. Arguably, 
the expressed mandate of providing ‘international protection’ would be 
more effectively executed if the agency was allowed to come closer to both 
the governments it was to supervise and to the refugees it was to provide 
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‘international protection’ to. As such, the opening of branch offices was an 
implied necessity of meeting its responsibilities. 
 
5.5.2 UNGA Resolutions 
An important development that further gave fuel to a broadening under-
standing of UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international protection’ was the 
agency’s involvement with Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. Already in the 
annual UNHCR report of 1953, the agency asked for guidance as to how to 
act in regards of the Chinese refugee situation and highlighted that fact that 
its branch office in Hong Kong would be at UNGA’s disposal.241 In spite of 
UNHCR’s mandate being restricted to people becoming refugees as a result 
of “events occurring before 1 January 1951”,242 UNGA Resolution 1167 
(XII) defined the Chinese refugees as “of concern to the international com-
munity” and authorised UNHCR to use its so-called “good offices” to “en-
courage arrangements for contributions” for both “emergency and long-term 
assistance”.243 Thus, by 1957, UNHCR received express approval of its 
branch office already set up in Hong Kong and was encouraged to use it to 
deliver assistance.  
The resolution bears no mentioning of neither ‘international protection’ 
nor ‘permanent solution’ and it is not clear which of the two categories UNGA 
intended it to fall within. However, in a resolution from 1958, UNGA refers to 
UNHCR’s assistance and emergency aid activities under UNREF as “pro-
tection activities” and welcomes ECOSOC’s call for these activities to “in-
crease”.244 And so it did. Under ‘good office’ and people ‘of concern to the 
international community’ phrase, UNHCR expanded its ‘international pro-
tection’ function to North-Africa when the Algerian refugee movement be-
gan in 1957.245 By 1959, UNGA authorised UNHCR to extend “good offic-
es in the transmission of contributions designed to provide assistance” to 
“refugees who do not come within the competency of the United Nations”, 
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which referred to the Algerian refugees.246 The resolution was the first ever 
to draw a distinction between mandate refugees and other,247 but due to the 
political climate at the time, this was arguably a necessary move to get the 
world community’s approval. The operations targeting Algerian refugees 
laid the groundwork of UNHCR movement into the developing world and 
became the blueprint for UNHCR in practically all the following programs 
during the 1960s and 1970s.248 
 
5.5.3 Legal implications 
By 1965, UNGA abandoned the term ‘good office’ in a resolution that re-
quested the UNHCR “to pursue (…) efforts with a view to ensuring an ade-
quate international protection of refuges and to provide satisfactory perma-
nent solutions to the problems affecting the various groups of refugees with-
in [its] competence”.249 By first introducing the term ‘good office’ and then 
later abandoning it, profound changes to UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘in-
ternational protection’ had occurred. Originally, the ‘good office’ refugees 
were often viewed as not in need of legal protection, but of material assis-
tance. According to Barnett and Finnemore, the ‘good office’ formulation gave 
UNHCR legal authorization to provide and coordinate assistance to people in 
need of material assistance rather than legal protection.250 The notion that 
UNHCR’s shift from Europe to Africa entailed an extension of the assis-
tance activities of the agency, but not ‘international protection’ have been 
shared by others.251 Holborn states that “[w]hat was required [in Algeria] 
was material assistance; there was no need of international protection and no 
chance of achieving a permanent solution except through repatriation of the 
refugees to their homeland”.252 What is notable is that different understand-
ings of ‘international protection’ appear to be emerging, according to the 
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contexts in which UNHCR operates. In developing countries, protection is 
seen as assistance, while in Europe, the 1951 Refugee Convention was the 
point of departure for refugee protection. This could be framed as a decou-
pling of ‘international protection’ as a concept that places responsibilities on 
UNHCR. 
The viewing ‘good office’ refugees and mandate refugees under a 
common ‘international protection’ function, it became clear that ‘interna-
tional protection’ was definitely to be understood both as providing legal 
protection and material assistance. In the annual report January 1965, 
UNHCR stated that “[t]he UNHCR programmes for material assistance to 
refugees have again proved to be an indispensable corollary to its basic 
function of international protection”.253 Venzke argues that leaving the 
‘good office’ concept behind was a part of UNHCR’s political strategy. In 
his words, “refugees outside its competence and under the umbrella of its 
good offices came to be part of its competence, not by amending the Statute 
or changing the black letter definition of refugees, but by way of a subtler 
semantic shift”.254 UNHCR itself presents the term ‘good office’ as “the 
most significant” in the evolution of UNHCR’s mandate and the organiza-
tion’s ability to adapt to new refugee problems.255 As we shall see in the 
next section, UNHCR grew to become a massive operational player in hu-
manitarian crises. 
 
5.6 ‘International protection’ as humanitarian task 
5.5.1 UNGA Resolutions 
Despite of the domination of material assistance, UNHCR’s activities up 
until 1971 was not yet characterized as operational. The still limited budget 
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of the organization has been pointed out as one of the practical reasons for 
this.256  
Due to the separation of Pakistan, 1971 became a “pivotal moment” 
in UNHCR’s history as it opened the door for an operational approach to 
providing ‘international protection’.257 UNGA endorsed UNHCR as the 
“focal point in co-ordinating international relief assistance for refugees from 
East Pakistan in India” and for their “meritorious humanitarian action for 
the relief of the suffering of refugees and of the population in East-
Pakistan”.258 Later, this has been viewed by many as the resolution that 
drove UNHCR to become operational.259 As a result of this operation, 
UNHCR arguably “grew well beyond its original mandate”260 as the focal 
point mandate had required great UNHCR presence in the field.261 By 1972, 
Africa had an estimated refugee population of more than one million. It was 
argued that these people were not in need of an ‘international protection’ 
understood as legal and diplomatic sense of the term. Instead of legal status 
under international law, the refugees were understood as in need of mone-
tary support and the development of direct assistance programs for refu-
gees.262  
In 1974, UNGA passed resolution 3271 which introduced the con-
cept "special humanitarian task” to describe UNHCR’s “duties”.263 The res-
olution marked a new approach to interpreting the organisation’s two man-
dates, and it was unclear whether the term ‘humanitarian task’ added a new 
mandate to UNHCR responsibilities or applied to ‘international protection’ 
and ‘permanent solutions’. Judging from a subsequent resolution the follow-
ing year, the latter question seems to be confirmed, though not unambigu-
ously. In subsequent resolutions, UNGA urge states to support UNHCR in 
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its humanitarian tasks, by “[f]acilitating the accomplishment of [UNHCR’s] 
tasks in the field of international protection” and strengthen durable solu-
tions and the organisation’s assistance programmes.264 As such, it seems as 
if the Statute mandates were to be understood as humanitarian in character, 
which is was clearly stated in Article 2 of the UNHCR Statute. Coles argue 
that between 1950s and 1970s ‘protection’ and ‘solutions’ were considered 
political, while material assistance, which was viewed as ‘humanitarian’, 
began to take up more space in the interpretation of ‘international protec-
tion’. 
Resolution 32/68 from 1977 comments on UNHCR’s “outstanding 
work” in “providing international protection and material assistance to refu-
gees and displaced persons” and in Resolution 35/41 from 1980, UNGA 
welcomes UNHCR efforts in “protection and assisting refugees and dis-
placed persons throughout the world”. 
 
5.6.2 Implications  
Between 1977 and 1980, the agency’s budget increased from $ 103 to 500 
million, which reflects the broadening scope of UNHCR’s activities. At the 
same time, between 1977 and 1982, the number of refugees grew from 3 
million to over 10 million, and UNHCR increasingly engaged in operations 
in developing countries. According to Loescher, UNHCR became increas-
ingly operational, running more and more programmes by itself and offering 
greater variety of services to refugees. In his observations, “UNHCR began 
to give greater priority to material assistance than to protection”.265 
It might be recalled, that the ExCom published its first Conclusions 
on International Protection in 1977, about at the same time as UNHCR had 
become highly operational with a strong field presence. It is noteworthy, 
that up until ExCom started adopting the conclusions, it does not seem as if 
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defining ‘international protection’ was very central. UNGA resolutions did 
not clearly express what ‘international protection’ meant, while UNHCR did 
so in their reports, though these hold very limited legal weight. One could 
say that UNGA resolutions have been used as a system of authorizations. 
One part of the explanation might be that, as noted in Section 2.4.3, the 
UNHCR’s ExCom did not enter into power until 1958. Furthermore, up 
until 1961, neither UNREF nor ExCom are viewed as to have addressed 
substantive matters of protection.266 Due to the application of unspecific 
language in UNGA resolutions, UNGA gave room for manoeuvre to the 
UNHCR.267 The same has been held to apply for the ExCom up until 1975, 
when the Sub-Committee of the Whole of International Protection was es-
tablished.268 It has been argued that the UNGA Resolutions of this period 
did not reflect changes in or for UNHCR itself.269  Goodwin-Gill has argued 
that “the underlying rationale for the General Assembly's endorsement of 
UNHCR protection activities appears to be necessity; the lack of protection 
creates a vacuum which the international community tries to fill”.270 
Arguably, at some point, UNHCR viewed the operational effects of 
protection as more important than the need to clarify the concept itself.271 
 
5.7 Conclusion: ‘international protection’  
By 1980, ‘international protection’ was both an operational and legal con-
cept, with a perceived discrepancy between the two interpretations. Centre-
pieces in the legal understanding were the 1951 Refugee Convention with 
the right to a legal status under international law and the prohibition of re-
foulement as the most fundamental. In many ways, this is similar to the 
meaning of ‘international protection’ as it was understood at the time of 
adopting the UNHCR Statute, though arguably with a more prominent focus 
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on refugee entitlements. The operational counterpart focused on material 
assistance in a humanitarian approach, aiming to be non-political and thus 
acceptable in the Cold War context.  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, UNGA was not always explicit on 
whether it endorsed UNHCR’s interpretations of ‘international protection’ 
or not. During this period, UNHCR gained a growing autonomy, both due to 
the refugee crisis that prevailed in its early years and the recognition of the 
agency’s ability to actually handle the situations, and due to the actual man-
date expansion given by UNGA. This again strengthened UNHCR autono-
my,272 and arguably gave the agency leeway to interpreting its mandate. 
This also led to a discrepancy between the operational and the legal inter-












                                                 




Chapter 6: 1980 – 2017: ‘International protection’ under 
strain 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of Chapter 6 is to analysis the evolution of ‘international protec-
tion’ between 1980s and up until today, which is understood to represent the 
third stage in the movement of UNHCR’s responsibilities. This stage has 
been framed as ‘protection and solutions’. Somewhat paradoxically, this 
period could be described both as a time where ‘international protection’ is 
allowed to expand in scope and as a time where delivering ‘international 
protection’ came under strain.  
By focusing on questions of human rights, durable solutions and cur-
rent protection challenges, I will highlight key developments that mark the 
most important shifts away from the previous interpretation of the concept. 
In Chapter 5, we learned that between 1950 and 1980, ‘international protec-
tion’ widened both in terms of who were covered by it and in terms of what 
it meant. UNGA resolutions and UNHCR Annual reports were used as pri-
mary sources to grasp the legal evolution that took place. As explained, Ex-
Com did not adopt annual conclusions on international protection until 
1977. In Chapter 6, the conclusions passed by ExCom will make out a con-
siderable source to interpret ‘international protection’. It might be recalled 
that in Chapter 2, I concluded that there are good reasons to hold these as 
binding on UNHCR, and if not, as a source of great importance in interpret-
ing ‘international protection’. Furthermore, UNHCR’s own Notes on Inter-
national Protection is a second source of importance in this chapter. To 
some extent, UNGA resolutions will also be analysed. Due to the shift in the 
legal sources I primarily draw upon, the structure will also be somewhat 
different. However, as in Chapter 5, I start the remainder of this chapter 
with a short section on the political context ‘international protection’ was 
interpreted in. Section 6.3 is focused on the strengthening of the role of hu-
man rights to the evolving meaning of ‘international protection’, while Sec-
tion 6.4 looks on how seeking solutions to the problem of refugee became 




map how the notion of ‘protection space’ has affected ‘international protec-
tion’ over the course of the 2000s. 
 
6.2 Context 
In the introduction of this thesis, I highlighted the inherent conflict between 
principles of state sovereignty and territorial supremacy on the one hand, 
and humanitarian norms of protection on the other as a key feature of the 
international refugee protection regime. While during the Cold War, 
UNHCR seemed to have been able to both confront and work with govern-
ments to strengthen refugee protection, towards the end of this epoch, the 
relationship between UNHCR and states became more strained.273 At the 
end of the 1980s, UNHCR expressed hopes for a brighter future for refugee 
protection, but was disappointed:  
Hopes that the new era would bring concerted international action to promote hu-
man rights, foster economic development and address other causes of forced mi-
gration in a context of international peace and security have not thus far been real-
ized (…) The cumulative effect of these developments has been to place even 
more severe strains on the international system for the protection of refugees and 
particularly on the institution of asylum.
274
 
Political instability, intercommunal violence, armed conflicts and violations 
of human rights forced millions of people to flee. In addition, economic dis-
ruption, global recession, unemployment, disparities of wealth within and 
among industrialized and developing countries, demographic pressures, en-
vironmental degradation and relentless poverty have fuelled migratory flows 
while complicating efforts to respond to the needs of refugees. 
Owing to an “explosion of refugee numbers”, funding decreased per 
refugee, despite the fact that budgets soared.275 So-called protracted refugee 
situations grew in numbers, and encampment became a term to describe the 
situations of many refugees. As I have argued throughout the thesis, chang-
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ing political environments have had far-reaching implications for UNHCR’s 
interpretation of its mandate.276 In 1980, UNGA notes that “refugees en-
counter serious difficulties in many parts of the world in obtaining asylum 
and that they are exposed to the threat of refoulement, arbitrary detention 
and physical violence”.277 
Deterrence policies and restrictive asylum regulations evolved. In 
2015, Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen observe that 
over the last three decades, even as powerful states routinely affirmed their com-
mitment to refugee law, they have worked assiduously to design and implement 
non-entree policies that seek to keep most refugees from accessing their jurisdic-
tion, and thus being in a position to assert their entitlement to the benefits of refu-
gee law.278  
It is within this context that ‘international protection’ has continued to 
evolve. 
 
6.3 Human rights approach to ‘international protection’ 
6.3.1 1980s: ‘Basic human rights’ 
An increased focus on human rights is noticeable in both UNGA resolutions 
and ExCom conclusion form the end of 1970s and onwards. As a conse-
quence of grave armed attacks against refugee camps during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s,279 human rights were lifted higher on the agenda. In Chap-
ter 5, Section 5.3.2, we saw that the ExCom in 1977 defined fundamental 
rights of the refugee as cornerstones of ‘international protection’. By 1978, 
UNGA called for the necessity of ensuring refugee’s “basic human rights, 
protection and safety” as a part of delivering ‘international protection’.280 
This was followed up in subsequent resolutions and, after considerable de-
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bate,281 the ExCom adopted conclusions noting that 'international protection' 
includes promoting "measures to ensure the physical safety of refugees and 
asylum-seekers".282 Arguably, the use of the term “physical safety” is just a 
re-phrasing of the principles that could be derived from UNHCR Statute 
Article 2, the UDHR Article 14 and the 1951 Refugee Convention Article 
33 (see Section 4.2.4 and 4.4). However, the concept of ‘basic human rights’ 
is arguably a new way of approaching ‘international protection’.  
ExCom conclusions no. 21 and no. 22 marked the start of a more 
distinct human rights approach to the interpretation of ‘international protec-
tion’ that prevailed during the 1980s. In a series of conclusions, human 
rights principles are being held as a fundament to the mandate of providing 
‘international protection’. In Conclusion no. 21, adopted in 1981, ExCom 
repeats the term and proclaims that “despite an increasingly broad under-
standing of the principles of international protection, the basic rights of ref-
ugees had been disregarded in a number of areas in the world”.283 The ques-
tion that arises is what ‘basic human rights’ in the context of ‘international 
protection’ entails. ExCom conclusion no. 22 lists a set of “minimum basic 
human rights standards” to be respected under the obligation to provide pro-
tection to refugees. The list includes, among others; the principle of non-
penalisation for crossing a border, the principles set out in UDHR, access to 
the basic necessities of life, including food, shelter and basic sanitary and 
health facilities, non-discrimination, protection under law. Moreover, it 
highlights that “the fundamental principle of non-refoulement including 
non-rejection at the frontier-must be scrupulously observed”.284 As such, 
‘international protection’ is seen to encompass a responsibility to promote 
these rights which are held as ‘basic’ and applicable to all human beings. 
This interpretation was endorsed by UNGA the same year.285 
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6.3.2 1990s: ‘International protection’: premised on human rights principles 
By 1990, a human rights-based approach to ‘international protection’ was 
widely applied in UNHCR secondary law instruments. Although long, the 
below quote from the 1994 Note on International Protection is an illustrating 
example on how wide-reaching ‘international protection’ has been under-
stood by UNHCR itself following the human rights impetus. It argues that 
the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention is a fundamental source for 
understanding the objective of UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international 
protection’ and frames the convention as a human rights instrument; 
The overall objective of international protection is summarized in the Preamble to 
the 1951 Convention: "to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of ... fun-
damental rights and freedoms" which all "human beings [should] enjoy ... without 
discrimination". International protection is thus premised on human rights princi-
ples. From this human rights perspective, the reason for the United Nations (mean-
ing, in this context, not merely the institution but the community of nations assem-
bled within it) to assume responsibility for the international protection of refugees 
seems clear: fundamental rights and freedoms are normally secured for the indi-
vidual by his or her Government. Since refugees do not enjoy the effective protec-
tion of their own Government, this normal remedy is unavailable, and it falls to the 
international community as a whole to provide the "international" protection nec-
essary to secure to refugees the enjoyment of these rights.286 
The quote raises many questions; some in terms of rules of treaty interpreta-
tion and others in terms of the validity of previous conclusions drawn in this 
thesis. Regarding questions of treaty interpretation, it is necessary to point to 
the fact that the 1950 UNHCR Statute came into force one year before the 
1951 Refugee Convention. While I have argued that ‘international protec-
tion’ in the 1950 UNHCR Statue should be interpreted in light of the 1951 
Refugee Convention (see discussion in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1) there is no 
obvious legal argument for entrenching the objective of ‘international pro-
tection’ directly in the Refugee Convention’s preamble. By doing so, the 
provision of ‘international protection’ can be understood to be almost all-
encompassing. If the initial objective of ‘international protection’ was to 
                                                 




provide refugees with a legal status under international law, it could now be 
understood to place major and almost utopic responsibilities on UNHCR. 
The Note on International Protection published by UNHCR in 1994 
represent one of the agency’s most detailed accounts of how ‘international 
protection’ is understood by the organisation. While it holds status as what I 
have referred to as secondary source of law, the Note has informed the dis-
course on ‘international protection’ and is much quoted. As such, as argued 
in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4, it might represent a source to ‘confirm’ an inter-
pretation of ‘international protection’ in so far as it has received approval by 
UNGA. 
What is certain is that the human rights approach to interpreting 
UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international protection’ caused its activities 
to widen even more. 
The tools of international protection range from the legal and diplomatic to the 
material and practical, from international conventions to national legislation, to 
diplomatic démarches to secure asylum for individual refugees threatened with re-
foulement, to such concrete measures as arranging basic food rations, clean water, 
and even planting defensive thornbush hedges around refugee settlements. Pres-
ence in the field and unhindered access to refugees (including asylum-seekers 
whose refugee status has not been determined) by UNHCR and others responsible 
for their protection have proved to be "tools" of crucial importance which are an 
indispensable complement to protection activities in the legal and political do-
mains. Practical protection in the field requires close working relationships with 
government officials at all levels, particularly those in direct contact with refugees. 
Since material assistance is often essential for refugees' survival, it can also be a 




6.3.3 1996: The rights to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement 
The institution of asylum, which according to ExCom “derives directly from 
the right to seek and enjoy asylum set out in Article 14 (1) of the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights” has been manifested “among the most 
                                                 




basic mechanisms for the international protection of refugees”.288 In ExCom 
conclusion no. 25, adopted in 1982, the principle of non-refoulement is de-
scribed as the basic principle of ‘international protection’ which “progres-
sively acquiring the character of peremptory rule of international law”.289 
While it has been argued that the principle of non-refoulement was some-
what disputed during the Cold-War,290 an overall consensus on the im-
portance of this principle started to manifest by the 1990s. In 1991, ExCom 
proclaimed non-refoulement and asylum “as cardinal principles of refugee 
protection”291 and in 1993, UNHCR’s annual Note on International Protec-
tion defined asylum as the “heart of international protection”, which was 
defined as “admission to safety in another country, security against re-
foulement, and respect for basic human rights”.292 In its following resolu-
tion, UNGA confirms “asylum as an indispensable instrument for the inter-
national protection of refugees” along with “the fundamental principle of 
non-refoulement”.293 In 1996, ExCom adopted a conclusion stating that “the 
principle of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation”,294 meaning that it 
was vied as to hold status as jus cogens. Allian frames it as the “final bul-
wark” of ‘international protection’. 
 
6.3.4 Questions of interpretation 
From an interpretation point of view, the discussion above raises questions 
as to where the ExCom and UNGA finds legal support for the human rights 
approach to interpreting UNHCR’s responsibility to provide ‘international 
protection’. It might be recalled that the term ‘human rights’ neither occurs 
in the 1950 Statute nor did it occur in the preparatory work (see Section 
4.6). As held by Feller, “[w]hile [the 1951 Refugee Convention] traced its 
origins broadly to human rights principles, it was more about states' respon-
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sibilities than individuals' rights”.295 Stevens notes that “[t]he push by the 
UNHCR towards a human rights conception of protection is striking in light 
of the origins of international refugee law”.296  
Although Stevens may be right in calling the development striking, 
interpreting ‘international protection’ in light of human rights principles is 
well-grounded in the rules of interpretation found in VCLT Article 31 and 
ICJ jurisprudence. Recall that in Section 2.3.1 it was argued that other 
sources of law can be applied in the interpretation of legal instruments, if 
considered relevant. This has, as we remember, been confirmed by ICJ in 
the Namibia case, among others. As such, the UNHCR Statute will neces-
sarily adapt in light of the evolution of the legal framework of the interna-
tional refugee protection regime as a whole. Consequently, the weight ac-
corded to the Statute’s preparatory work and the circumstances of its con-
clusion might decrease over time due to their status as supplementary means 
of interpretation. 
As human rights law and humanitarian law started to evolve on the 
international plane, it is relevant to consider whether ‘international protec-
tion’ should be interpreted in light of this evolution. When ExCom adopt 
conclusions confirming this, UNHCR is most likely obligated to act accord-
ingly. Chetail goes as far as to argue that human rights law has transformed 
the legal protection framework within the international refugee regime “to 
such an extent that (…) human rights law is the primary source of refugee 
protection, while the [refugee law] is bound to play a complementary and 
secondary role”.297 A less radical approach could be grounded in the work 
of Arthur Helton who states that “refugees are no less protected than are all 
other person under international human rights law”.298 He concludes that; 
[i]n sum, refugee protection encompasses two basic issues. One is determining the 
coverage afforded to refugees under international law; the other concerns compli-
ance where coverage exists. The 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol and the Statute 
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are tradition-
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al sources of protection of refugees. Principles embodied in humanitarian, human 
rights and aliens law also apply to their situation.
299
 
The implications of this is that is that UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ 
mandate must be interpreted in light of these principles and thus, UNHCR’s 
responsibilities will also be encompass human rights obligations.300 The 
evolution towards a human rights approach to interpreting ‘international 
protection’ has been criticised for being “largely illusory”, due to the politi-
cal, economic and diplomatic determinants of the protection delivered to 
refugees.301 Parallel to the human rights approach to ‘international protec-
tion’, UNHCR also sought to strengthen its focus on seeking ‘durable solu-
tions’.302 Eventually, from the beginning of the 1980s, UNHCR was accused 
of an "increased tendency to violate refugee rights".303 This will be the sub-
ject of Section 6.4 below. 
 
6.4 ‘International protection’ as ‘durable solution’ 
6.4.1 1980s: Durable solutions: precondition for ‘international protection’ 
UNHCR’s transition from being a non-operational to operational agency is 
closely connected to the mandate as ‘focal point’ in large humanitarian op-
erations as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.6 and with the subsequent shift 
towards interpreting ‘international protection’ in light of ‘durable solutions’. 
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This started in the 1980s, and was strengthened under High Commissioner 
Jean-Pierre Hocke.304 
In UNHCR’s Note on International Protection from 1986, ‘interna-
tional protection’ is defined to revolve around three components; 1) legal 
protection on an individual level; 2) strengthen refugee law on an interna-
tional level and/or in national legislation, and; 3) search for ‘durable solu-
tions’. UNHCR goes on to argue that ‘international protection’ must ulti-
mately be defined as the search for solutions, which entails a need for “ac-
tion on the ground”.305 
What is worth noting is that ‘durable solutions’ is held as the “per-
haps most important” of the three components of ‘international protection’ 
and is now seen as to represent “an essential precondition for the effective 
exercise of the High Commissioner's international protection function”. In 
the Note, UNHCR argues that because reaching a ‘durable solution’ is the 
primary goal of the agency’s activities, 'international protection' is essential-
ly of a temporary nature.306 The Note argues that ‘durable solutions’ might 
be “lost sight of” if the agency is preoccupied with the provision of ‘interna-
tional protection’;  
durable solutions may sometimes be lost sight of in the process of meeting imme-
diate protection objectives. For example, the non-refoulement of refugees, their 
admission to camps and the provision of assistance can meet immediate material 
and physical needs; but living as well as life itself requires attention.
307
 
Somewhat radically, it is concluded that “providing immediate protection 
without identifying durable solutions should not be regarded as an end in 
itself”.308 The Note seems to depart from a series of UNGA resolutions and 
ExCom conclusions which separate UNHCR’s mandate into two distinct 
functions: 1) providing ‘international protection’ an; 2) seeking ‘permanent 
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solutions’. Furthermore, since 1981, both ExCom and UNGA proclaimed 
the “fundamental importance of international protection as the primary task 
entrusted to” UNHCR.309 To my understanding, the wording implies that 
‘international protection’ is to be understood as an independent mandate of 
primary priority to UNHCR. As such, when UNHCR in the Note quoted 
above expresses concern that the search for ‘durable solutions’ is under-
prioritized due to the safeguarding of protection needs, it seems somewhat 
out of touch with the conditions of interpretation laid out in ExCom conclu-
sions and UNGA resolutions. As might be recalled from the discussion in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.4 on primary sources of interpretation, these are 
sources granted either binding force, or close to decisive weight in deter-
mining how ‘international protection’ is to be interpreted. As such, the Note 
seems to depart from established practice of superior organs.  
 UNHCR’s new practice of interpreting ‘durable solutions’ as a pre-
condition for ‘international protection’ stands in stark contrast to the notion 
that providing ‘international protection’ is in fact an end in itself. It might be 
recalled that in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, I asked whether ‘international pro-
tection’ was to be interpreted in light of ‘permanent solution’ or not, and if 
so, whether that would construct limits as to what the mandate to provide 
‘international protection’ would encompass. With recourse to the VCLT 
Article 31, I argued that ‘international protection’ had to be given meaning 
in light of its context, which included UNHCR’s second mandate to seek 
‘permanent solutions’. That being said, I noted that it would seem somewhat 
unsatisfactory to provide UNHCR with a two-tier mandate without both 
levels filling a distinct function. Thus, the conclusion reached was that ‘in-
ternational protection’ should be understood as to hold as autonomous 
meaning, although – and due to its nature as a substitute for state protection 
– ‘international protection’ must be understood as a temporary measure. 
This conclusion seems to find support in Goodwin-Gill’s interpreta-
tion of UNHCR’s ‘international protection’ mandate, which he argues is an 
end in itself, “so far as it serves to ensure the fundamental human rights of 
the individual”. Furthermore, it is held that “[n]either the objective of solu-
                                                 




tions nor the imperatives of assistance, therefore, can displace the autono-
mous protection responsibility which is borne, in its disparate dimensions, 
by both states and UNHCR”.310 
While the conclusion reached in UNHCR’s Note on International 
Protection seems to stand in contrast to the practice of interpretation that 
evolved in UNGA and ExCom, it did not take long before these organs fol-
lowed suit. As we saw in Chapter 5, this is not uncommon for UNHCR, 
which often gives express to a certain degree of ‘distinct will’ to create sec-
ondary law which is later endorsed through active or tacit approval. By 
1987, ExCom notes that “international protection is best achieved through 
an integrated and global approach to protection, assistance, and durable so-
lutions”311 and in 1991, it states that “the protection of refugees remains an 
ongoing, difficult challenge in need of solution-oriented approaches”.312 By 
1995, ExCom proclaims that “that the search for solutions to refugee prob-
lems is an integral part of the High Commissioner’s mandate for interna-
tional protection”.313 ExCom’s Standing Committee argues that “the protec-
tion mandate is therefore intrinsically linked with the active search for dura-
ble solutions. This is necessarily embedded in an international legal frame-
work which ensures predictability and foreseeability”.314 
As we shall see below, the increasing focus on durable solutions al-
tered UNHCR’s policy priorities towards repatriation and prevention. 
 
6.4.2 1990s: Repatriation and prevention 
In the above section, we saw that from the beginning of the 1980s, the 
meaning of ‘international protection’ evolved from a focus on providing a 
legal status to refugees, promoting the rights to seek and enjoy asylum and 
securing the principle of non-refoulement, to also include the achievement 
                                                 
310 Goodwin-Gill, 2014, 37. 
311 ExCom, Conslusion no. 46 (XXXVIII), General, 1987. 
312 ExCom, 1991. 
313 ExCom, Conclusion no. 77 (XLVI), General, 1995. See also ExCom, Conclusion no. 71 
(XLIV), General, 1993. 




of ‘durable solutions’. ‘International protection’ seemingly ceased to be the 
primary aim of UNHCR, replaced by the aim of seeking ‘durable solutions’. 
As we have seen above, UNHCR even held that targeting short-term ‘inter-
national protection’ could in fact obstruct a clear focus on ‘durable solu-
tions’. 
From the beginning of the 1990s, repatriation became the favoured 
approach to ‘durable solutions’ and High Commissioner Sadako Ogata 
named the 1990s ‘The Decade of Repatriation’. Repatration, she argued, 
was a part of the comprehensive approach to ‘international protection’ of 
refugees.315  In 1992, UNHCR argued that the organisation needed to 
“strike(s) a humane balance between the interests of affected States and the 
legal rights, as well as humanitarian needs, of the individuals concerned”.316 
The quote points to the fundamental conflict between state sovereignty and 
the rights of refugees described in Chapter 1, and represents a new trend in 
UNHCR’s official interpretation of its mandate. To my knowledge, nowhere 
before had UNHCR seen it as its task to consider the interests of States in 
defining the scope of its mandate. In the previously quoted Note on Interna-
tional Protection of 1994, UNHCR states that 
[f]rom the standpoint of the international protection of refugees, finding remedies 
for the lack of protection in countries of origin is essential to achieve the preferred 
solution of voluntary repatriation, and also to prevent future refugee flows.317  
The above quote illustrates how the merging of providing ‘international pro-
tection’ and seeking ‘durable solutions’ eventually resulted in UNHCR tar-
geting the situation of refugees both outside and inside countries of origin. 
Suddenly, UNHCR identified the prevention of refugee movements as an 
objective of ‘international protection’. 
As we learned in Section 6.3, the 1980s were partly characterized by 
UNHCR’s focus on defining ‘international protection’ from a human rights 
perspective. This continued into the 1990s, at least in formal legal instru-
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ments, and we saw a strengthening of the principles of asylum and non-
refoulement. However, critics have argued that the human rights focus with-
in the international refugee protection regime was short-lived,318 and that the 
regime developed into a two-tiered system favouring European asylum-
seekers. In practice, this arguably entailed that UNHCR’s response to refu-
gee movements was largely limited to “localized material and other aid in 
tandem with the ad hoc promotion of voluntary repatriation” which sought 
to “localize and contain refugees in the less developed world” on the one 
hand, and facilitate “exile abroad for European refugees” on the other.319 
Barnett and Finnemore hold that “the ultimate form of protection was de-
fined as getting refugees home as soon as possible”, which caused the refu-
gees’ own choices to be neglected.320 
The evolution of the understanding of ‘international protection’ as a 
means towards the end – ‘durable solutions’, must be understood in light of 
the political context. In Section 6.2 I highlighted the growth of restrictive 
asylum policies and significantly increasing numbers of refugees world-
wide as factors that put UNHCR and ‘international protection’ under strain. 
Furthermore, in a conclusion from 1989, ExCom recognised that refugee 
movement could have “destabilizing effects”321 and in ExCom conclusion 
no. 80, it is stated that “involuntary displacement (…) can impose signifi-
cant intra-regional burdens, and may also affect security and stability at the 
regional level”.322 Moreover, between 1991 and 2000, the Security Council 
adopted a number of resolutions linking refugee movements with security 
concerns.323 As such, the so-called ‘preventative protection’ shift was a re-
sult of outside pressure. Due to its implementation of policies aiming to 
push for repatriation, UNHCR has been accused of violating the fundamen-
tal principle of non-refoulement.324 Furthermore, due the policy orientation 
towards preventing people from becoming refugees, UNHCR implemented 
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measures that later resulted in jeopardising the right of refugees to flee their 
countries, to seek asylum from persecution in other countries.325 Clearly, 
this represents a critical breach of some of the cornerstones of ‘international 
protection’. 
 
6.4.3 Questions of interpretation 
Restricting ourselves to this shift in interpretation, rather than the actual and 
partly failing implementation, a question that arises is whether the repatria-
tion and prevention approach to interpreting ‘international protection’ is in 
line with rules of interpretation outlined in Chapter 2. 
To my understanding, the focus on ‘durable solutions’, hereunder re-
patriation, is in accordance with Article 31 of the VCLT (see general discus-
sion on ‘durable solutions’ above, Section 6.4.1). However, the ‘prevention 
protection’ approach – illustrated by the quote from the 1994 Note on Inter-
national Protection –  is more challenging, and for several reasons. First of 
all, applying VCLT Article 31, the concept of ‘international protection’ in 
Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute seem to flow from a premise that the per-
son being provided protection is outside of their country of origin (Section 
1.2.1 and 4.2.2). While the ordinary meaning of ‘international protection’ 
gives no clear answer, in my understanding, the context does. It might be 
recalled that in order to be granted status as refugee in accordance with 
UNHCR Statute Article 6 (see Section 1.2.1), a person needs to have 
crossed an international border. Furthermore, every activity highlighted in 
Article 8 of the Statute as measures of ‘international protection’ are directed 
towards the refugee. As such, UNHCR’s mandate seems to come into force 
at the moment a person leaves her country of origin.326 Thus, to interpret 
preventative measure as the ultimate form of ‘international protection’ 
seems to be incompatible with the textual context of Article 1 in the 
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UNHCR Statute. Furthermore, it might be recalled that in Chapter 4, Sec-
tion 4.2.3, I concluded that because the lack of state protection is the defin-
ing characteristic of all refugees, remedying this situation must presumably 
be the primary objective of ‘international protection’. This, I argued, would 
be done through the representation of refugees on the international plane. 
However, and again, it is conditioned on the lack of state protection actually 
having manifested. Indeed, to my knowledge, the preparatory work does not 
even mention prevention activities as a part of the mandate to provide ‘in-
ternational protection’ (see Section 4.3). 
 The above analysis is not necessarily a hindrance to the doctrine of 
implied powers being activated. From Chapter 2, Section 4.2.2, it might be 
recalled that when the express powers of an organisation, that is, the powers 
one can read from the principles of interpretation derived from VCLT Arti-
cle 31, are perceived as insufficient to meet the intentions of the drafters, the 
doctrine of implied powers (or doctrine of effectiveness) is invoked as a tool 
for extension. This, however, is not a carte blanche doctrine to evoke any 
activity remotely related to its original mandate. On the contrary, it has to be 
entrenched in the objectives of the international organisation and “essential 
to the performance of its duties”.327 It is clear that the objective of ‘interna-
tional protection’ has evolved since 1950, and arguably encompasses more 
than providing refugees with a legal status under international law, securing 
the principle of non-refoulement and promoting the fundamental entitlement 
according to the 1951 Refugee Convention. That being said, it is hard to 
accept that the concept also entails preventing people from becoming refu-
gees. Not only would it pose challenges to the non-political character of 
UNHCR flowing from Article 2 of the Statute, but to my knowledge, there 
are no UNGA resolutions or ExCom conclusions confirming such an inter-
pretation. In spite of the fact that UNHCR adopted the already quoted Note 
on International Protection in 1994, stating that repatriation and prevention 
are the primary aims of ‘international protection’, this bears little weight on 
its own.  
                                                 





In conclusion, the prevention approach to interpreting ‘international 
protection’ is not in line with rules of interpretation. This conclusion is ech-
oed in the words of Barutciski, who warns against a “non-legal approach to 
UNHCR’s mandate extension” and concludes that “[a] regime that is not 
based on coherent and workable legal principles is destined to fail the 
world’s refugees”.328 
 Although currently faced with a current protection crisis and de-
creasing funding, UNHCR seem to have left the ‘prevention protection’ 
policies. And while seeking ‘durable solutions’ is still a priority, it is broad-
ly recognised that to many refugees, neither repatriation, resettlement nor 
integration are available in the foreseeable future. To add to the challenge, 
millions of the world’s refugees are situated in countries where the legal 
framework of the international refugee protection regime does not apply. 
After a short introduction to interpretation of ‘international protection’ in 
2000s, Section 6.5 analyses how ‘international protection’ is understood 
specifically in this context. 
 
6.5 ‘International protection’ in crisis? 
6.5.1 2000: ‘International protection’: solving refugee problems in the field 
We recognize that millions of refugees around the world at present have no access 
to timely and durable solutions, the securing of which is one of the principal goals 
of international protection.329 
The above quote is taken from the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants of 2016, which was adopted after the first ever UN Summit on 
migration. The quote raises a question; when ‘durable solutions’, one of the 
principal goals of ‘international protection’, is unavailable, how does 
UNHCR meet its international legal responsibility to provide just that – ‘in-
ternational protection’? 
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As the quote indicates, ‘international protection’ is understood to 
embody several goals. In the annual Note of International Protection from 
2009, UNHCR stated that  
International protection function has evolved greatly from being a surrogate for 
consular and diplomatic protection to ensuring the basic rights of persons of con-
cern to the UNHCR. International protection encompasses a range of concrete ac-
tivities, covering both policy issues and operational concerns, and is carried out in 
cooperation with States and other partners, with the goal of enhancing respect for 
the rights of people of concern and resolving their problems.
330
 
UNHCR thus identifies the enhancement of respect for the rights of refugees 
and resolving their problems as the goal of its mandate to provide ‘interna-
tional protection’. The Note leaves it unclear what the term “problems” of 
refugee specifically entails. However, judging from the original objective 
and purpose of UNHCR, it could refer to the lack of legal status. While this 
is part of the answer, we have seen that UNHCR has widened its scope of 
activates significantly. As a consequence, it now targets a broad range of 
problems refugees face as a result of being forced to leave its home. Key to 
UNHCR’s problem-solving is service and assistance delivery in the field. 
And while we recall that field operations started as early as in the 1960s and 
1970s, there seemed to be a discrepancy between the legal and the opera-
tional understanding to ‘international protection’. In my view, this discrep-
ancy seems to an extent to have dwindled. 
Already in 2003, ExCom conclusion no. 95 confirms that “interna-
tional protection is both a legal concept and at the same time very much an 
action–oriented function” which should be operationalised.331 In its subse-
quent session, UNGA passed a resolution which represents a vivid exempli-
fication of how far away from the original ‘international protection’ man-
date we have come. In the resolution, it is proclaimed that “international 
protection of refugees is a dynamic and action-oriented function”. It then 
goes on to note that “the delivery of international protection is a staff-
intensive service that requires adequate staff with the appropriate expertise, 
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especially at the field level”.332 In sum, from being a non-operational agen-
cy, with a small staff, a limited budget and a mandate focused on remedying 
the legal aspect of the refugee situation, UNHCR is now a staff-intensive 
service-provider. As this is sanctioned in UNGA, there are no legal grounds 
for objecting to such an evolution. One current challenge, however, is what 
Stevens frames as a plethora of ‘protection’ oriented concepts and “a lack of 
a clear or consistent meaning” of what ‘international protection’ really 
means.333 In the next section, we shall see how ‘international protection’ is 
interpreted within a ‘protection space’. 
 
6.5.2 2010: ‘Protection spaces’ 
Protection is first and foremost about direct protection delivery in the field.
334
 
In the 2010 Note on International Protection, UNHCR begins by stating that 
the world is facing “challenges to the protection space”, but nowhere in the 
note is the concept defined.335 Nevertheless, under the headline “protection 
space”, UNHCR describes the ‘international protection’ activities undertak-
en in countries that have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 
1967 Protocol. Thus, the term ‘protection space’ is taken to describe the 
space in which UNHCR delivers ‘international protection’ in countries out-
side of the legal refugee protection framework, but nevertheless a part of the 
international refugee protection regime. 
Barnes describes ‘protection spaces’ as a measure to provide ‘inter-
national protection’ to refugees. In her words; “before UNHCR can provide 
refugees with protection, an environment conducive to the facilitation of this 
protection is required. In certain contexts, such an environment has come to 
be called ‘protection space’”.336 In the above quoted Note on International 
Protection, UNHCR lists several activities in which the agency engages in a 
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‘protection space’. This includes refugee status determination (RSD), which 
is described as “the basis for the delivery of protection and assistance”. As 
recognised in the UNGA resolution from 2004, this is a staff-intensive ac-
tivity that requires presence in the field. Furthermore, the Note lists activi-
ties that bear resemblance to the legal protection measures provided by the 
very first refugee protection agencies under LoN, including individual legal 
guidance and liaison functions. Importantly, the supervision of compliance 
with the principle of non-refoulement is central. In such an environment, 
one would assume that the promotion of the 1951 Refugee Convention was 
defined as a top-priority in providing ‘international protection’. It might be 
recalled that the Refugee Convention is recognised as the fundamental pillar 
of the international refugee protection regime. What is noteworthy, howev-
er, is that the Note bears no mentioning of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
While writing the article on ‘protection spaces’, Barnes worked as an 
associate resettlement officer at the UNHCR. Recognising that UNHCR 
offers no clear definition of the concept, she argues that ‘protection space’ 
could be understood 
as an environment which enables the delivery of protection activities and within 
which the prospect of providing protection is optimized. It is important to remem-
ber that that protection space is fluid and expands and retracts, thus requiring a va-
riety of efforts to ensure its continued existence and expansion.337 
The quote highlights the need to ensure a “continued existence and expan-
sion”. One could argue that promoting the 1951 Refugee Convention would 
be one significant manner in which UNHCR could meet this objective. 
However, as for instance in Lebanon, which currently hosts 1.1 million ref-
ugees, though not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, UNHCR has 
“toned down” its request that the country becomes party to the treaty.338 
Martin Jones raises several valid concerns in this regard; 
The adoption of the language of ‘protection space’ to describe the task to be per-
formed in countries that have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention raises con-
cerns based upon how it privileges international interests, fora and UNHCR as the 
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negotiator; devalues the normative strength of obligations towards refugees; and 
allows the underlying responsibilities for the provision of refugee protection to 
drift from the state to UNHCR.339 
There are two aspects I would like to dwell on; 1) the drift of responsibili-
ties from the state to UNHCR, and; 2) the normative strength of obligations 
towards refugees.  
 Already in 2009, Slaugther and Crisp argue that UNHCR had been 
transformed to an organisation that “shares certain features of a state”.340 
This characterisation was given due to UNHCR taking on tasks such as 
RSD, issuing documents, providing access to shelter, food, water, health 
care and education, administering and managing refugee camps, and estab-
lishing policing and justice mechanisms that enable refugees to benefit from 
some approximation to the rule of law.341 While Puggoini questions whether 
such activities could be understood as ‘international protection’ at all,342 
Zieck points to a fundamental challenge in defining the meaning of ‘interna-
tional protection’ that arises when UNHCR “is co-acting in the same territo-
ry [as states] and engages in tasks that appear to stretch far beyond those 
originally entrusted to it”, that is; “where does national protection end and 
international protection begin?”343 
 From Chapter 3 and up until now, we have seen that ‘international 
protection’ in the UNHCR Statute has expanded immensely from when it 
was adopted. This has been grounded in UNGA resolutions, ExCom conclu-
sions, tacit approval or the doctrine of implied power. As such, the actual 
expansion into a protection sphere that is strikingly overlapping with that of 
state’s  is not necessarily a breach of the rules of interpretation as outlined in 
VCLT Article 31 and 32. Indeed, the fact that some of the key refugee host-
ing countries at the moment have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention 
or its 1967 Protocol might actually obligate UNHCR to take on bigger re-
sponsibility of meeting the ‘basic human rights’ of refugees and seeking to 
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‘solve their problems’. Nevertheless, in a time of so-called protection crisis 
there is need for a clarified division of obligations. If not, how do we know 
what actor to hold accountable? This raises a bigger question; when 
UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘international protection’ has been interpret-
ed to encompass such a wide range of mechanisms, how could the obliga-
tions possibly be met? In my understanding, it boils down to identifying 
what UNHCR has to do. This relates to the second point in Jones’ concerns 
on ‘protection spaces’; the normative strength of obligations towards refu-
gees. 
 According to the UNHCR Statute Article 8 a, UNHCR “shall pro-
vide for the protection of refugees falling under the competence of his Of-
fice by promoting the ratification of international conventions for the pro-
tection of refugees”. As we know, the 1951 Refugee Convention is the con-
vention to be promoted under UNHCR. The question which arises is wheth-
er UNHCR is acting in compliance with its own constituent instrument by 
not promoting the ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
 To interpret Article 8 a of the UNHCR Statute, we apply the VCLT 
Article 31 as outlined in Section 2.3.1. According to Article 31, we have to 
start in the ordinary meaning of the term – in our case – “shall”.  
The term “shall” is an imperative giving express to an obligation. 
Judging from reading the word in isolation, it seems to leave little, if no, 
room for exceptions. However, according to VCLT Article 31 and 32, when 
interpreting a legal instrument, recourse must also be made to its ‘context’, 
‘objective and purpose’, in addition to ‘preparatory work’ and ‘circumstanc-
es of the conclusion’, if to ‘confirm’ an interpretation (see Chapter 2). Arti-
cle 32 also allows for subsequent practice of UNHCR to be used as a source 
of interpretation, if used to ‘confirm’ the above conclusion, and if approved, 
either through active endorsement or tacit approval, by states. 
As the UNHCR Statute holds no articles expressing that exceptions 
are to be made under certain circumstances, I find that the context supports 
the above reading of ‘shall’. Furthermore, the objective and purpose does 




ities placed on the organisation in order to achieve ‘international protection’. 
It might be recalled that representation on the international plane in order to 
remedy the lack of legal status under international law was seen to be at the 
heart of UNHCR’s objective and purpose (see Section 4.2.3). As the inter-
national refugee protection regime evolved, the 1951 Refugee Convention 
became key to meeting UNHCR’s statutory obligations. To my understand-
ing, neither the findings in the preparatory work nor in the circumstances at 
the time of the Statute’s conclusion indicate that a clear conclusion in light 
of VCLT Article 31 should be doubted. 
In numerous ExCom conclusion and UNGA resolutions highlight 
and stress the promotion of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Pro-
tocol as the most central pillar of ‘international protection’. Almost paradox-
ically, the 2010 Note on International Protection, where UNHCR deliberates 
on ‘protection spaces’, defines the 1951 Refugee Convention as “the corner-
stone of international refugee law”.344 Furthermore, in the latest UNGA res-
olution, the organ reaffirms that the 1951 Refugees Convention is “the 
foundation of the international refugee protection regime” and recognizes 
the importance of “their full and effective application by States parties and 
the values they embody”.345 After applying the rules of VCLT Article 31 
and 32, I find that UNHCR’s non-promotion of the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion in major refugee hosting countries to raise serious concerns as to 
whether the organisations fulfils its international legal responsibilities. That 
being said, the doctrine of implied powers and effectiveness might alter this 
preliminary conclusion. 
As we have seen throughout the thesis, the doctrine of implied pow-
ers and effectiveness has been used as to entrench the expansion of ‘interna-
tional protection’. Perhaps we are able to ground the non-promotion of the 
1951 Refugee Convention in this doctrine?  
In the Repatriations case, where we first saw express given to the 
doctrine of implied powers, ICJ stated that an international organisation 
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“must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provid-
ed in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being 
essential to the performance of its duties”.346 The ECJ has held that the doc-
trine shall be used in order for an international organisation to “safeguard its 
prerogatives”. At first glance, one might conclude that the doctrine of im-
plied powers cannot be taken to allow UNHCR to deviate from a defining 
aspect of its mandate, that is, promote the legal status of refugee under in-
ternational law. In Section 2.3.2 it was concluded that the doctrine of im-
plied powers/doctrine of effectiveness can be invoked as a tool for exten-
sion. However, if UNHCR decides not to promote the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention, in order to gain access to refugees, the answer to this question is 
less obvious. As we have seen throughout the thesis, the meaning of ‘inter-
national protection’ has expanded beyond the legal representation of refu-
gees on the international plane. It also includes providing material assistance 
and meeting the basic human rights of refugees, understood to encompass 
access to shelter, food, sanitation, health care and primary education. When 
a conflict arises between one aspect of ‘international protection, that is, the 
promotion of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and another aspect, that is, 
providing assistance and services to refugee, the doctrine of effectiveness 
could arguably allow exceptions to be made. As for now, I will suggest no 
final conclusion. To my understanding, this question will have to be contin-
ued to be debated in the future. My hope is that I have contributed to this 
debate by establishing a point of departure, that is, concluded on the interna-
tional legal responsibility as originally derived from the UNHCR Statute. 
However, one might ask whether UNHCR’s mandate to provide ‘interna-
tional protection’ to refugees, as this was meant at the time of adopting the 
Statute, has been lost in interpretation. 
 
6.5.3 Conclusion: The meaning of ‘international protection’ today 
In its 2016 Note on International Protection, UNHCR describes the current 
state of affairs in the following way: 
                                                 





Eighty-six per cent of those in need of international protection remained in mid-
dle-income and developing countries, particularly States neighbouring those mired 
in displacement-inducing conflicts, such as the Islamic Republics of Iran and Paki-
stan. Half of the top 10 refugee hosting countries – Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ugan-
da and Sudan – are located in sub-Saharan Africa. With respect to the Syria crisis, 
just five countries – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – have shouldered 
the responsibility of hosting over nine tenths of all of the refugees. Turkey is cur-
rently the largest host country in the world, with 2.7 million Syrian refugees, while 
Pakistan follows as the second-largest host country, with 1.6 million refugees – 
almost all from Afghanistan. Beyond these, in other countries in Africa, the Amer-
icas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, refugees were also received and hosted in 
numbers that were smaller in absolute terms, but which, nonetheless, tested or 
overstretched the capacity of national reception and asylum systems and host 
communities.347 
In this context, Stevens argue that because key refugee hosting states are not 
parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the current situation is more pre-
carious and subject to change than it would be if these states has acceded to 
the treaty.348 Does this context matter to the interpretation of ‘international 
protection’? 
Throughout the thesis, we have seen that the interpretation of ‘inter-
national protection’ is a highly dynamic activity. Many have pointed to the 
lack of a consistent and truly comprehensive definition of ‘international pro-
tection’, a lack that renders the entitlements of refugees unstable and vola-
tile. The below quote highlights the flexibility in how ‘international protec-
tion’ is understood; 
Persons having fled Syria who cross international waters in search of international 
protection should be allowed to disembark at a place of safety, meaning a place 
which is physically safe, where basic needs can be met, and where they are safe 
from refoulement. UNHCR appeals to all States to ensure that civilians fleeing 
from Syria are protected from refoulement and afforded international protection, 
the form of which may vary depending on the processing and reception capacity of 
countries receiving them, while guaranteeing respect for basic human rights.349 
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‘International protection’ is thus conditioned by a fundamental core of ac-
cess to seeking asylum, the principle of non-refoulement and basic human 
rights. The rest seem to depend on the context. In the 2016 Note on Interna-
tional Protection, UNHCR discusses the future strengthening of ‘interna-
tional protection’ and lists “core elements” of which to build this on. These 
are 
access to territory, registration and group-based or individual asylum processes, 
the establishment of adequate reception arrangements, and the granting of an ap-
propriate status and associated rights for those found to be refugees 
 The ExCom conclusion of the same year seem to confirm these elements, 
while at the same time expressing an all-encompassing approach to under-
standing ‘international protection’. The conclusion states that the following 
quote represents the most central measures to provide ‘international protec-
tion’; 
 
the principle of non-refoulement, as well as the importance of providing assistance 
and seeking comprehensive approaches towards the implementation of durable so-
lutions, as appropriate, from the outset of a displacement situation, while ensuring 
that no-one is left behind.350  
 
In my view, the above quote more or less captures all aspects of what we 
have seen to fall within the scope of proving ‘international protection’ 
throughout UNHCR’s 67 years of existence. In many ways, we again see a 
discrepancy between the operational understanding of ‘international protec-
tion’ and the legal one. Perhaps this is what Puggioni points to when stating 
that we are seeing the emergence of a “non-protection regime”, character-
ised by “questions of sovereignty, borders control, crisis management, chal-
lenges in the south, and interpretation of legal definitions”?351 Without a 
meaningful definition of what ‘international protection’ entails it is close to 
impossible to hold UNHCR accountable for its international legal responsi-
bilities towards providing refugee with ‘international protection’ and it is 
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equally challenging for refugees to voice demands for their entitlements 






















Part III:  
Conclusions 
Chapter 7: Concluding remarks and thoughts for the future 
Providing International Protection to Refugees – UNHCR’s mandate lost in 
interpretation? is an analysis of how the meaning of ‘international protec-
tion’ in Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute has evolved over time. My overall 
conclusion is that the meaning of ‘international protection’ has been sub-
jected to a tremendous evolution in the course of UNHCR’s 67-year long 
history.  
 At the time of adoption of the UNHCR Statute, ‘international protec-
tion’ meant providing refugees with represent on the international plane. In 
1950, refugees were described as an anomaly under international law (Chap-
ter 3) and UNHCR was established as the institutional centrepiece of the 
emerging international refugee protection regime as a means to remedy this. 
Thus, I concluded that ‘international protection’ evolved around to core ob-
jectives;  
• Promoting recognition under international law through refugee status 
• Promoting physical safety from persecution through access to the 
territories of states. 
‘International protection’ was a non-operational concept that provided 
UNHCR with a supervisory function.  
Today, ‘international protection’ is a highly flexible concept, but 
seemingly consists of the following core elements; 
• The respect for non-refoulement 
• Status under international law 
• The rights to seek asylum 
• Basic human rights, including the rights to shelter, food, and basic 
sanitary and health facilities 
• Non-discrimination 




‘International protection’ has become an operational concept, which also 
includes objectives of ‘durable solutions’. 
Through this an attempt to come closer the core of UNHCR’s statu-
tory international legal responsibilities, I find that the concept of ‘interna-
tional protection’ is a highly flexible and volatile term. This raises consider-
able questions related to accountability of UNHCR and the entitlements of 
refugees. While in legal documents, UNHCR seem to act in compliance 
with Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute, in practice, it seems like the original 
meaning of ‘international protection’ has been lost in interpretation. ‘Inter-
national protection’ is a concept in flux, and raises challenging legal ques-
tions in regards of responsibility. This should in my opinion be subject to 
more research, as currently millions of refugees are dependent on UNHCR 
mandate to provide ‘international protection’. They should be entitled to a 
clear and concise meaning of what the rights under the international refugee 
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